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In the fall of 1918 an unparalleled influenza pandemic spread throughout the 
world. More than a quarter of Americans became ill, and at least 600,000 died. For 
many Virginians, this was a time of acute crisis that only could be compared to the days 
of the Civil War. This thesis describes Spanish influenza's impact on Virginia, primarily 
focusing on the cities of Newport News, Richmond, and Roanoke. It details influenza's 
emergence in Virginia and explores how state and city officials dealt with this 
unprecedented epidemic. This study examines how the epidemic disrupted daily routines 
of life and overwhelmed the state's medical community. This thesis briefly discusses the 
effect that the segregation of races had on the spread of influenza and the role that women 
played in battling the epidemic. Sources used in this study include newspapers, 
manuscript collections, and government documents. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1918 America's attention was focused on the war in Europe. Men had left 
home to fight for the Allied cause, and women had crossed the Atlantic to serve as 
nurses. Newspaper headlines kept the public informed of events overseas. On the home 
front, patriotic citizens contributed to Liberty Loan drives and made sacrifices for the war 
effort. During the fall, however, a deadlier threat overshadowed the war. An 
unprecedented influenza pandemic spread around the world, eventually claiming the lives 
of a wide range of people. Over one-quarter of Americans became ill, and at least 
675,000 deaths resulted from influenza and pneumonia. More American servicemen died 
from influenza than in battle. Unlike other outbreaks, this strain of influenza targeted the 
most productive members of society: young men and women between the ages of twenty 
and forty. 1 
The influenza epidemic tested all levels of government and overwhelmed a 
medical system already depleted by the war effort. Health organizations mobilized to 
contain influenza, but authorities could do little except offer methods of prevention. 
Doctors and nurses were in great demand, and many communities opened emergency 
hospitals to treat the most serious cases. The battle against influenza was waged by 
1Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., Epidemic and Peace, 1918 (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1976), 205-07. 
courageous men and women who set aside their fear of this deadly illness and 
volunteered to aid the sick. 
2 
During the fall outbreak in the United States, influenza first emerged among men 
stationed at military bases and ports on the East coast. It quickly spread throughout the 
civilian population of neighboring cities and towns. Federal, state, and local officials 
wrestled with what course of action to pursue. Health authorities often disagreed about 
the benefits of closing ordinances and quarantines. Although the epidemic peaked in 
many eastern cities by mid to late October, influenza remained a threat throughout the 
remainder of 1918. 
Virginia did not escape the ravages of what commonly was referred to as 
"Spanish Influenza." During October 1918 life in the state was disrupted by the 
pandemic. Schools, churches, and a variety of public places closed their doors during the 
epidemic's peak. Newspaper obituaries were filled with the names of young men and 
women whose lives had been cut short by influenza. Although the epidemic abated in 
November, influenza reappeared the following month in a less deadly form. 
By the beginning of 1919 life was returning to normal in Virginia and in the 
United States. The war had ended and Spanish influenza had mysteriously disappeared. 
The impact of the influenza outbreak faded from memory with the passage of time. The 
influenza pandemic, however, should not be forgotten. The fall of 1918 was a time of 
acute crisis as communities struggled to combat a menacing illness that attacked an 
alarming number of the most productive members of society. 
CHAPTER2 
THE FALL OUTBREAK: SEPTEMBER- NOVEMBER 1918 
Scientists remain uncertain about the origins of the influenza pandemic. In March 
1918 an influenza outbreak was reported at the Camp Funston training base in Kansas. 
That same month, military installations in the Midwest and the Southeast reported cases 
of influenza. This milder first wave largely went unnoticed in the United States. By 
April the epidemic had spread to Europe where it quickly infected American, British, 
French, and German troops. 1 
In May, the New York Times noted that a mysterious illness, similar to the grippe, 
was spreading throughout Spain: "This malady attacks all classes, from the King down to 
his humblest subjects." It was speculated that this disease originated in Germany and 
would spread to other nations. Because news in Spain was not censored during the war, 
many details about the epidemic in that nation were reported. This severe form of 
influenza soon became known as "Spanish influenza," though German troops dubbed the 
illness "Flanders Fever." The disease ravaged Europe and appeared in other countries 
1 Gina Kolata, Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the 
Search for the Virus that Caused It (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), 10-12; 
Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 18-25; K. David Patterson and Gerald F. Pyle, "The 
Geography and Mortality of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic" Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 65 (1991), 5. 
3 
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including India, China, Australia, and New Zealand. During the summer, however, the 
virus seemed to fade from these hard-hit nations. 2 
By late summer a more lethal strain of the influenza virus had returned to the 
United States. In mid-August several European ships arrived in New York City carrying 
passengers who had become ill during the voyage. Over 200 cases of influenza had 
developed on a Norwegian liner. Local health officials objected to a quarantine of these 
ships believing that Spanish influenza was nothing more than the familiar grippe.3 
The fall outbreak of influenza first struck East Coast military installations. 
Boston's Commonwealth Pier was the focal point of the epidemic when the second wave 
hit the United States in late August. Within days Spanish influenza spread to the civilian 
population of Boston. On September 8, nearby Camp Devens reported an outbreak of 
influenza. The flu also appeared at a naval base in Philadelphia, the Marine training 
camp at Quantico, Virginia, and the Great Lakes Naval Training Station in Chicago. 
After attacking the navy bases, influenza struck the army. The numerous and widespread 
army camps helped spread influenza throughout the United States.4 
2New York Times, 31May,21June1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 26-29; 
Patterson, "The Geography and Mortality of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic," 7-8; Kolata, 
Flu, 12. 
3Patterson, "The Geography and Mortality of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic," 8; 
New York Times, 22 September 1918. 
4Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 39-40, 56-62; Kolata, Flu, 13; New York Times, 22 
September 1918. 
5 
Influenza first appeared in Virginia at army camps and naval bases. On 
September 13 an "acute respiratory infection" developed at Camp Lee, near Petersburg. 
At 9:30 P.M. a newly arrived soldier from the Fifth Battalion, Depot Brigade, was sent to 
the base hospital. A few hours later, ten additional cases were reported in other sections 
of the camp. Fearing an epidemic, camp officials banned all forms of public gatherings 
and canceled motion picture and theater shows. Three days after the outbreak began, the 
base hospital could not care for the number of men that had fallen ill. By the morning of 
September 16 there were 500 cases of influenza at Camp Lee. To treat the influenza 
victims, base officials established special infirmaries in the squad rooms of the company 
barracks.5 
The commanding general of the cantonment, Brigadier-General Charles A. 
Hedekin, believed that a quarantine would be ineffective because Spanish influenza 
already had spread throughout the East. The camp surgeon, Charles Y. Brownlee, did 
recommend preventive measures. To halt the spread of the airborne disease, curtains 
were placed around the head of every cot on the base. In addition, patients had to wear 
gauze masks when they were being transported to an infirmary. The doctors warned 
soldiers to watch for symptoms of influenza such as severe chills, headache, back pain, 
high fever, and acute nose and throat irritation.6 
5 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 15, 17 September 1918. 
6Ibid., 17 September 1918. 
6 
By September 20 Spanish influenza had surfaced in nine army training camps in 
the United States. Out of the 9,313 cases reported, 6,583 existed at Camp Devens in 
Massachusetts. Within three days, influenza had appeared at eighteen additional camps, 
and Camp Devens reported 424 new pneumonia cases. Camp Dix, New Jersey had the 
second largest number of cases with 1,897 sick. Camp Lee also reported over 1,000 
cases of influenza. The transportation of army troops in crowded trains worsened the 
spread of the disease. Twelve of239 members of the 328th Labor Battalion were ill when 
the group left Louisiana for Virginia. When they arrived in Newport News, over one 
hundred soldiers had become sick, and sixty additional men soon developed influenza. 
After the senior medical officer of the Norfolk Naval Base announced 150 influenza 
cases, officials quarantined the military installation.7 
By September 26, the number of influenza cases in army camps totaled 35,146, 
pneumonia cases numbered 3,036, and 700 individuals had died. Only thirteen camps 
remained free of influenza. Two days later, army camps reported over 16,000 additional 
cases of influenza. While the number of new cases had decreased at Camp Devens, other 
bases experienced an increase in new cases. More than 2,600 cases had developed at 
Camp Lee. Camp Eustis, Virginia reported twenty-six cases for the first time. Camp 
Devens still reported the largest number of deaths, the majority resulting from influenza 
patients who had subsequently contracted pneumonia. A quarter of the soldiers at Camp 
7Ibid., 19, 21, 23 September 1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 62; Newport 
News Daily Press, 19 September 1918. 
7 
Devens had contracted the flu, and ten percent of these cases had developed into 
pneumonia. 8 
Influenza forced the War Department to reduce the transport of troops to France 
by at least ten percent. The provost marshal canceled the entrainment of 142,000 white 
men scheduled for October 7 to 11. These soldiers were to have reported to training 
camps throughout the United States. The War Department took precautions to halt the 
spread of influenza, but acknowledged that more camps would be affected. To alleviate 
the crowding of troop trains, only one soldier was allowed in each seat and berth. 
Officials also dispatched additional doctors and nurses to the camps where the epidemic 
was the most serious.9 
Camp Lee authorities hesitated to enact a quarantine of the entire base, but did 
advise relatives not to visit the camp until they learned if their family member was ill and 
quarantined. Medical authorities also launched an educational campaign to inform 
soldiers about the precautions to take against the disease. Camp officials gave addresses 
on sanitation and health inspection. Doctors warned soldiers to refrain from talking 
directly to another person and to avoid crowds. Soldiers were expected to keep a 
partition around their bed and avoid using dirty towels and drinking cups. Breakfast was 
8 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 25, 27, 29 September 1918, New York Times, 27 
September 1918. 
9 Richmond Times-Dispatch. 27 September 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 27 
September 1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 62. 
postponed by twenty minutes to give soldiers extra time to tend to personal hygiene. 
Health officials instructed soldiers to contact a doctor if they began to feel sick. 10 
8 
The epidemic at Camp Lee concerned officials in Richmond. The head of the 
Richmond Health Department, Dr. Roy K. Flannagan, believed an unprecedented 
outbreak of the disease was inevitable and warned residents that he "would not be 
surprised if we were visited by the most widespread epidemic of grippe the city has ever 
known." To prepare for Spanish influenza, he visited Camp Lee to study the precautions 
officials had implemented. He also issued a special bulletin about influenza that city 
residents could obtain from the Health Department. The Health Department displayed 
posters in restaurants, hotels, and streetcars informing the public about the prevention of 
influenza. Flannagan warned the public to avoid crowds and poorly ventilated areas. He 
directed residents to walk to work or school rather than ride on streetcars.11 
As Flannagan had feared, influenza began spreading from army camps to other 
areas of the state. By the beginning of October the epidemic was underway in Richmond 
(the population of Richmond was approximately 170,000). Local doctors had reported 
340 cases of the flu by noon on September 30. Five hours later the total had risen to 
10Richmond Times-Dispatch, 22, 29 September, 12 October 1918. 
11Ibid., 18, 20, 29 September 1918. 
9 
425. In addition to the cases that developed on military bases, 19,512 influenza cases and 
359 deaths were reported in Virginia during September 1918.12 
Richmond and state officials debated whether to quarantine Camp Lee. 
Flannagan met with State Health Commissioner Ennion G. Williams to consider if 
soldiers from the army base should be prevented from entering Richmond. Flannagan 
also addressed the closing of schools and other public places. Because Richmond was 
faring better than other areas of the country and no deaths had occurred, Flannagan 
maintained that no drastic action was needed. He promised to protect children by barring 
students from attending school if their homes were infected. Flannagan acknowledged 
that if the situation worsened, he would have no choice but to close schools and other 
public places. 13 
The Times-Dispatch urged the public not to panic and voiced its support for the 
military quarantines: 
Unfortunate as health conditions are, there is no reason for the people as a whole 
to be alarmed .... Often before the country has experienced epidemics of a 
similar character, if not identical in diagnoses. The plain every-day "grippe" has 
had its day again and again .... for the time being the military camps are the most 
fertile fields for influenza .... it is important to quarantine each soldier or even 
each company of soldiers. All the army medical officers can do is to act swiftly 
just as soon as the outbreak manifests itself. The disease will be conquered in the 
12John Andriot, ed., Population Abstract of the United States (Mclean, Virginia: 
Andriot Associates, 1983), 828; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 1 October 1918; Annual 
Report of the State Board of Health and the State Health Commissioner to the Governor 
of Virginia for the Fiscal Year Ending September 3 0, 1919 (Richmond, Virginia, 1920), 
7. Hereinafter cited as Annual Report of the State Board of Health. 
13 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 1 October 1918. 
10 
camps and elsewhere. It may take a heavy toll meanwhile, but it will sooner or 
later surrender to science.14 
Roanoke health officials also urged the public to remain calm. City Health Officer Dr. 
W. Brownley Foster expected many influenza cases to develop, but advised people to 
take a "sane view" of the epidemic: "The one big question is whether there is sufficient 
reason for becoming panicky. People have the idea it is something new, dreadful and 
with unknown dangers. It is the same old grippe we have had all the time, but we do not 
know the essential causes for its being now pandemic." Foster initially opposed the 
closing of schools and churches. He warned residents to avoid public gatherings and 
urged the sick to remain at home until all symptoms of influenza had passed. 15 
By early October Spanish influenza had affected every region of Virginia. Both 
state and local health officials continued to educate the public about the disease and 
warned people to avoid crowds. The State Board of Health distributed 20,000 placards 
and 100,000 bulletins explaining methods of prevention (see figure 1). Postmasters, 
school officials, and local defense councils helped disperse these materials throughout 
Virginia and urged the public to reprint and re-circulate these bulletins in their 
communities. 16 
14Ibid. 
15Roanoke Times, 28September1918. 
16Annual Report of the State Board of Health, 6; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 16 
October 1918. 
Figure 1 
sAv.:E:iF:v·ou R·s ELF··· 
' - •• ~ .•• ,:~: • • ••.•• t ,, " . ~ .... ~ • • ,;.· •• ••• :; .•• ! ; ·:·. . ~ .. ~ ' .• ~ . . . . 
~--.~ <:r .F~.9'1.~.tNFLUJ::NZA·· A~~'-... --
. PNEUMONIA .. : .: .. TUBERCULOSIS·... WHOOPING COUGH 
BAD COLDS · · ~DIPHTHERIA · . MENINGITIS 
. · MEASl.£5 : SCAALET FEVER . MUMPS 
'FO[LOW. TWo>sIMPLE RULES . 
. RULE 1 · . 
Whenever you ~ough or 
sneeze, bow your head or 
put a bandker~ef over 
your mouth and noae. 
RULE 2 
Don't put in your mouth fingers, ptncila. 
or anything elae that doca not belon~· · 
there, nor use a common drinkiai 
cup. 
1"he Germs of these DiseB.Sel are spread through the secre-
tions of. the mouth and nose of sick people and carriers. 
FumiahedbyTHE VJRGJNIA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH 
PLEASE POST: Colmdl or ll1U.11al o.r ..... c. R. Keilty, Ftdtral ntl:! Stmlary 
11 
Source: A11n11al Report of the State Board of llca/t/1 and tl'IC Star..• llc:altli CommuJ1011cr to tire Go..-crnor of 
l'irginia for the Fiscal JC:ar £11dmj; .f}.:ptcm!-cr JO. 1919. Richmond. Virginia. 1920. 11. 
12 
Other Virginia cities ordered the closing of public meeting-places and schools. 
After approximately 1,800 influenza cases had been reported to Petersburg health 
officials, the city Board of Health advised the public to avoid crowds and ordered the 
closing of all schools, churches, and places of public amusement. Health officials in 
Hopewell issued a similar closing order after 300 cases had developed. The mayor of 
Fredericksburg, J.P. Rowe, followed the advice of the city school and health boards and 
closed all places of public assembly. After three individuals died from influenza, the 
Board of Health of Elizabeth City County closed schools, theaters, and meeting places in 
the county and the cities of Hampton and Phoebus. By the end of September, thirteen 
men had died from influenza at the Norfolk Naval Base. After 350 new cases were 
reported in the city on October 2, Norfolk officials closed schools and public meeting-
places. Schools, churches, and other public meeting places were closed in the small town 
of West Point after 300 cases were reported. One hundred cases developed among local 
shipyard employees. West Point also lacked a sufficient number of doctors and nurses. 17 
The epidemic had become so serious that the government now considered the 
fight against influenza to be part of its war effort. Representatives of the War and Navy 
Departments, the United States Public Health Service (USPHS), and the Red Cross joined 
to formulate a plan to battle influenza. Surgeon General Rupert Blue of the USPHS and 
the Acting Surgeon General of the Army, Robert F. Noble, considered a quarantine of the 
civilian population to be impractical. The USPHS appointed Health Officers to direct the 
17Ibid., 30 September, 1-3, 6 October 1918. 
13 
fight against influenza in their states. These Health Officers were instructed to wire 
information about the epidemic to the Public Health Service.18 
Twenty-six states had reported influenza cases by September 26, and the Surgeon 
General's office reported that the weekly death rate had almost doubled. On September 
28, Congress appropriated $1,000,000 to help combat the epidemic. This appropriation 
supplemented the Public Health Service's annual budget of $3,000,000. Some of the 
funds were used to equip hospitals and pay physicians and Red Cross nurses. The 
USPHS also began investigating the cause of Spanish influenza and searching for a 
• 19 
vaccine. 
The spread of influenza in Washington concerned government officials. The 
city's population had grown during the war, and people frequently shared one-room 
apartments. With the war continuing in Europe, it was vital that government employees 
remain healthy. Prominent leaders who became ill included Speaker of the House Champ 
Clark, Majority Leader Claude Kitchin, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin 
Roosevelt.20 
The Public Health Service declared the city a sanitary zone and ordered District 
Commissioners to close all movie houses, theaters, and dance halls. City schools were 
18New York Times, 19, 27 September 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 
September 1918, Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 48-50. 
19Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 September 1918; New York Times, 28, 29 
September 1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 52. 
20Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20, 29 September 1918; Roanoke Times, 4 October 
1918. 
14 
closed on October 2, and all public gatherings, including Liberty Loan parades, were 
canceled. The federal go\'emment ordered employees to wear gnuzc mnsks and 
staggered work hours so that streetcars would be less crowded. The go\'emmcnt n)so 
commandeered buildings on F Street to be used ns hospitals for wnr workers. Senators 
and congressmen instructed their constituents to n\'oid tra\'cling to Wnshington during the 
epidemic. Senator Thomas S. Martin of Virginia was one of se\'eral senators nnd 
congressman who urged President Woodrow Wilson to hnh the influx of new government 
employees into Washington. In mid-October the War Department joined other 
departments in limiting the arrival of new employees to those essential ro go\'emmenr 
work. The Supreme Court also extended its recess due to the epidemic in the nntion's 
capitaJ.21 
Throughout the nation, influero:a became more serious among ci\'ilians as rhe 
situation improved in the nnny camps. By Ocrober 3, forty-three srares and Wnshingron. 
D.C. had reported cases of Spanish influen1..a. Although influen1..a was declining in some 
army bases, camps across the country had reported more than I 00,000 cases. 0\'er 7,000 
individuals had contracted pneumonia, and 2,148 deaths had occurred in the military. 
New cases at Camp Devens had decreased substantially. but Camps Meade and Dix still 
battled the epidemic.22 
21 Jbid., 3,4, 15, 180ctober 1918,RiclrmondTimes-Dispatclt. IOOctober 1918; 
New York Times, 4, 18 October 1918. 
22Ric/1mo11dTimes-Dispatch. I. 3October1918; Roa11okc Times. 3 October 1918. 
15 
Approximately 8,500 cases of influenza and 167 deaths had been reported at 
Camp Lee by October 2. Brigadier-General Hedekin promised that "everything humanly 
possible is being done to handle the Spanish influenza situation." Officials converted 
five barracks into an annex for the base hospital where the most serious cases would be 
treated. Instead of using one squad room in each barrack as originally planned, now one 
barrack in each battalion was used to care for ill soldiers. Officers and enlisted men who 
had recovered from influenza and were thought to be immune assisted the camp's 
medical team. 23 
General Hedekin denied that a quarantine of Camp Lee was being debated. 
Officials also questioned the quarantine that Richmond was considering against soldiers 
from the camp. One officer commented, "It is entirely a matter for Richmond to decide, 
but if there are already 600 cases in that city there is already sufficient seed of the germ to 
insure the spread of the disease. However, if Richmond wants to quarantine she can do 
it." Indeed, the limits of a quarantine were illustrated at Camp Lee. Officials prohibited 
anyone from leaving or entering the veterinary school, which was separated from the 
main part of the base, yet cases of influenza had appeared among its students. 24 
The influenza epidemic continued to worsen in Richmond, and by October 2, 
approximately 850 cases had been reported. Dr. Flannagan cautioned the public that the 
greatest danger associated with influenza was contracting pneumonia. The following 
23 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 October 1918. 
24Ibid. 
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day, 279 new cases were reported and the total number of deaths stood at ten. Because 
schools in Richmond and other areas of the state were still open, Dr. Williams instructed 
local districts about the prevention of Spanish influenza. Williams hoped schools would 
not have to be closed, but told superintendents throughout the state that the epidemic was 
serious. He ordered that placards listing preventive measures be posted in every 
classroom and insisted that students with sore throats or coughs immediately leave 
school. Williams maintained that these safeguards would help protect children from the 
disease: "With proper care and instruction, schools can be made positive agencies for the 
prevention of the spread of Spanish influenza in the community."25 
Major H. A. Crosby, head of the General United States Hospital in Richmond, 
believed that the public had failed to heed the advice of officials like Williams and 
Flannagan. Crosby quarantined his hospital and stressed that the public did not fully 
understand the seriousness of the epidemic. Half of the 200 patients at the hospital were 
influenza victims, and officials planned to double the capacity of the hospital from 1,000 
to 2,000 beds.26 
By October 4 almost 2,000 cases of influenza had been reported in Richmond, 
and Williams described the epidemic as "grave." While other cities including Norfolk, 
Washington, and Boston had closed public meeting-places, Richmond officials wanted to 
avoid doing so. Dr. Flannagan visited theaters in the city to ensure that they were 
25Ibid., 3, 4 October 1918. 
26Ibid., 4, 5, October 1918. 
17 
disinfected and ventilated. Churches were instructed to keep windows and doors open 
during services and to avoid using the common cup in sacraments. Despite these 
preventive measures. the public hesitated to patronize many meeting-places. ll1eater nnd 
movie house operators reported a decrease in business.27 
On October 5 Flannagan joined his counterparts in other cities and advised 
Richmond officials to close all public nnd private schools. churches, and meeting-places. 
Flannagan remarked that the influen7.a outbreak was intensifying in Richmond: .. llterc is 
no lessening of the epidemic, which is manifestly still on the increase. ll1e city 
authorities arc doing all within their power to combat it. "21 While Dr. Williams and the 
State Board of Health initially disagreed with the closing of schools. Flannagan 
concluded that they should be closed even if the decision had no direct effect on the 
spread of the disease. The Richmond School Board supported this decision and ordered 
the city schools closed from at least October 7 to I 3. Henrico and other surrounding 
counties also decided to suspend some of the schools in their districts.29 
City officials initially exempted the Virginia State Fair from the order closing 
public meeting-places. Dr. Flannagan met with the fair's board of directors and informed 
them that because of the open-air nature of the fair, city health authorities would not force 
its closing. Following the advice of Flannagan. the board agreed that the indoor 
27Ibid .. 2. 5 October 1918. 
211 Ibid .. 6 October 1918. 
29Ibid .. 6. 7 October 1918. 
18 
sideshows would be eliminated. Some questioned why the fair was exempt from the 
closing orders passed in Richmond. C. C. Cochran, the deputy clerk of the U.S. District 
Court in Big Stone Gap, wrote Governor Westmoreland Davis, "Will you kindly advise 
me why the exception is made to the Drastic Action which is provided for every other 
gathering? I am advised that over 100 cases of Spanish influenza can be traced directly 
to the small county fair held at Jonesville, Lee County, Virginia, and that all assemblies 
of every character tend to spread the disease. "30 
On October 7 Surgeon General Rupert Blue recommended that health officials 
throughout the nation close all schools and public gathering places. Due to the large 
number of new cases in Virginia, the State Board of Health forbad public gatherings, 
recommended that the public avoid crowds, and advised against train and streetcar travel. 
In newspaper ads, State Health Commissioner Williams and State Board of Health Acting 
President R. R. Tucker warned Virginians that indoor and outdoor gatherings were 
"positively dangerous." C.R. Keiley, Executive Secretary of the Virginia Council of 
Defense, endorsed the Board's decision and maintained that the public had a "patriotic 
duty" to avoid these potentially harmful gatherings. The closing orders had little effect 
on halting the spread of the disease but, as Alfred Crosby states, "public health officials 
30Ibid., 6, 9October1918; Annual Report of the State Board of Health, 6; C. C. 
Cochran to Westmoreland Davis, 7 October 1918, Westmoreland Davis Executive 
Papers, 1918-22, "Influenza," Box 14, Library of Virginia. Hereinafter cited as Davis 
Executive Papers. 
19 
had to do something, and closing up theaters, schools, pool halls, and even churches was 
the style in fall 1918."31 
Acting on the advice of the camp surgeon, General Hedekin prohibited the issuing 
of passes to Camp Lee soldiers who wanted to visit Petersburg or Richmond. Individuals 
who had official business in the two cities would be able to leave, and visitors could be 
admitted to the base. This epidemic of influenza, which was more serious than previous 
outbreaks, puzzled the medical officers at Camp Lee. Members of the medical staff had 
contracted the illness, and three medical officers and one nurse had died.32 
By October 8 over 10,000 cases of influenza existed in Richmond. Drs. Williams, 
Flannagan, and A. M. Willis, a representative of the Johnston-Willis Sanatorium, stated 
that the epidemic was the worst crisis the city had faced since the Civil War. The doctors 
predicted that 900 to 1,500 residents could die within six to eight weeks, and 25,000 to 
50,000 cases could develop in the next several months if influenza continued to spread. 
Unlike the 1889 epidemic, which affected the very young and very old, the doctors noted 
that this particular influenza strain targeted people between the ages of sixteen and forty. 
Spanish influenza struck the healthiest and most productive members of society. 33 
The public noted this characteristic of the 1918 epidemic. Robert Herndon Fife 
II, a college professor in Middletown, Connecticut, had family that lived in 
31 Newport News Daily Press, 8 October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 5 
October 1918; Roanoke Times, 8 October 1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 74. 
32Richmond Times-Dispatch, 7 October 1918. 
33Ibid., 8 October 1918; New York Times, 29 October 1918. 
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Charlottesville. He informed his mother, Sarah Fife, that classes had been canceled at his 
school because many students had become ill. Robert Fife inquired about the situation at 
home: 
I am really anxious about the influenza, as Virginia is always mentioned along 
with Massachusetts as one of the most strongly affected districts. Up here it 
seems to be an affection of the young, as I don't think I have heard of any person 
past forty-five being affected with it. Perhaps the older ones have still some 
immunity handed down from the great epidemic of twenty-five years ago. I do 
hope none of you all get it. There are literally hundreds of cases up here, but 
pneumonia seems to be mostly lacking.34 
Robert's sibling Margaret Fife described the influenza epidemic to their sister Ella 
Katherine Fife, a Red Cross nurse stationed in France: "If you were here you would have 
your hands full for the town is begging for nurses. This Spanish Influenza has surely 'got 
the ups' on this country. The funny thing about it is that only young people seem to have 
it, very few cases over thirty-five years old."35 
The influenza epidemic in Roanoke was serious, but less severe than in Richmond 
(the population of Roanoke was approximately 50,000). By October 4, 500 cases had 
been reported to health officials; however, only two individuals had died in the city. The 
Roanoke Board of Health initially chose not to quarantine the city or issue closing orders, 
but did embark on an educational campaign. Officials spoke at schools and businesses 
and distributed leaflets detailing preventive measures to take against influenza. They 
34Robert Herndon Fife II to Sarah Ann Graves Strickler Fife, 6 October 1918, 
Correspondence of Ella Katherine Fife Freudenberg, Box 1, Alderman Library, 
University of Virginia. Hereinafter cited as Freudenberg correspondence. 
35Margaret Whitler Fife to Ella Katherine Fife, 11 October 1918, Box 1, ibid. 
21 
instructed movie theater managers to observe their customers closely for any signs of 
illness and asked the public to avoid large social gatherings. The Board of Health 
requested that ministers instruct their congregations about flu prevention and ordered 
private funerals for all influenza victims.36 
Dr. Foster wished to avoid closing Roanoke churches, schools, and meeting 
places. He hoped that by warning the public to avoid crowds, the people could halt the 
spread of influenza on their own. The Board of Health promised to pay close attention to 
the epidemic, and if conditions worsened, vowed to implement "drastic regulations" 
immediately. However, after the State Board of Health recommended the indefinite 
closing of all schools, churches, and public places, Dr. Foster issued a closing order on 
October 6. Four days later, over 1,000 influenza cases and twenty deaths had been 
reported in Roanoke.37 
Over 280 cases of influenza and three deaths had been reported in Newport News 
by October 1 (the population of Newport News was approximately 35,500). The Board 
of Health warned the public about drinking from common glasses and recommended that 
children remain in their homes. Health officials hoped that public meetings would not 
have to be banned. To prevent such a ban, the public was urged to follow simple 
36 Andriot, Population Abstract of the United States, 829; Roanoke Times, 5, 6 
October 1918. 
37Ibid., 6, 8, 11 October 1918. 
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precautions such as avoiding crowds, going to bed at the first sign of illness, and avoiding 
the coughs and sneezes of others.38 
On October 7 Newport News officials decided to ban public gatherings and close 
public places such as churches, theaters, and poolrooms. City schools had been closed 
since October 4 as a precautionary measure. During the war, Newport News' population 
had risen from 25,000 to 70,000 and the city's hospitals proved to be inadequate during 
the epidemic. To alleviate the overcrowding, an emergency hospital was established at 
Walter Reed High School. By October 9, city officials estimated that 8,000 to 10,000 
cases of influenza existed in Newport News. At least 3,500 additional cases had 
developed at the shipyard. In one week, Spanish influenza had claimed the lives of thirty 
individuals. While local doctors initially thought that a mild type of influenza had 
infected Newport News residents, they now stated that the disease was more serious than 
originally believed.39 
In the Newport News area, Langley Field, the Hampton Normal School Negro 
Camp, and the National Soldiers' Home were quarantined. No cases had developed at 
the soldiers' home, but officials believed a quarantine was the best method of preventing 
influenza's appearance at their institution. Hampton officials had closed movie theaters 
in the city, but residents determined to see a motion picture traveled to the theaters that 
38 Andriot, Population Abstract of the United States, 828; Newport News Daily 
Press, l, 2, 5 October 1918. 
39Ibid., 5, 8-10 October 1918, Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8 October 1918. 
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remained open in Newport News. Norfolk schools, churches, nnd public gathering plnces 
were closed. Norfolk also opened nn emergency hospiraJ, nnd the city's doctors, 
druggists, and morticians worked day nnd night. The Timcs-Disparcli reported that the 
large number off urloughed soldiers from nearby military bases exacerbated the epidemic 
in the Norfolk area.40 
In Pulaski, a town of 7,000 residents, 2,500 cases of influenza nnd fifty deaths had 
been reported by October 10. The number of new pneumonin cases continued to nlnrm 
the public. On one Sunday alone, nine funerals took place in the t0\\11. Mayor E.W. 
Calfee ordered all churches, schools, businesses, and public places closed. Pulaski 
officials asked doctors in Bristol, Virginia for assistance in fighting influenza, but Bristol 
was also combating at least 500 cases. Calfee urgently requested doctors from Roanoke, 
but with physicians at a premium, Dr. Foster found it difficult to locnte volunteers to send 
to Pulaski. Doctors from Roanoke, Bristol, and Richmond eventually arrived to care for 
the sick in Pulaski. A New York physician, Dr. J. T. Foard, also answered the call for 
help and treated the most serious cases nt the emergency hospital that had been 
established at the Elks' Home.41 
As Richmond hospitals quickly filled v.ith patients, officials opened an 
emergency hospital at John Marshall High School. To fund the hospital, the city council 
40Ncwport News Daily Press, 2 Ocrobcr I 918; Richmond Times-Dispatch. 8 
October 1918. 
41 Ibid., 5, 8, 13 October 19 I 8; Roanoke Times 6, 11 October 1918. 
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appropriated $25,000. Dr. Lawrence T. Price, a professor at the Virginia Medical 
College, was named hospital director. Price appointed Mrs. Agnes Randolph, the 
executive secretary of the Antituberculosis Society, as his Assistant Chief Medical 
Director. The conversion of John Marshall High School into an emergency hospital took 
place in less than a day. Work began at 7:00 P.M. on October 7, and the hospital 
admitted its first patients the next morning. Dr. Flannagan praised the leadership of Dr. 
Price and his staff and marveled at the school's rapid transformation. An emergency 
hospital for black influenza patients was opened in the Baker School.42 
Influenza also raged in Petersburg, where the first cases of influenza had appeared 
among the relatives of soldiers at Camp Lee. Petersburg health authorities persuaded 
Camp Lee officials to prohibit civilian visits to the base except in emergency cases. The 
limited medical facilities in Petersburg made it difficult for the city to treat ill transients, 
such as the wives of Camp Lee soldiers. Five thousand cases of influenza had been 
reported by October 15, and the illness was beginning to spread among the city's black 
population (the population of Petersburg was approximately 31,000). Petersburg schools, 
churches, barbershops, and ice cream parlors closed during the epidemic. City officials 
appropriated $10,000 for an emergency hospital staffed by six physicians and seven 
42Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8, 9, 11October1918; "Report of Acting 
Superintendent A. H. Hill to the Richmond School Board" Minutes of the Richmond 
School Board, 31 October 1918, minute book entitled "November 1916-February 
1919," Richmond School Board office, Richmond, Virginia, 354. 
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graduate nurses. The need for physicians in Petersburg remained high. After five local 
doctors became ill, USPHS physicians arrived to treat the influenza patients.43 
By the second week in October, Camp Lee officials judged that the worst of the 
epidemic had passed. Most of the new cases on the base came from the veterinary 
school, which had been affected later than other areas of the camp. On October 12- one 
month after the first influenza case appeared-10,876 cases of the flu had been reported. 
For the first time in three weeks fewer than 5,000 soldiers remained under treatment. The 
total number of deaths on the base had risen above 500.44 
By October 9 approximately 200,000 cases of influenza had been reported in 
United States army camps. The deadliest period on the bases was the week ending on 
October 11. During this one-week period, influenza and pneumonia killed 5,380 soldiers. 
By comparison, in the first six months of 1918, deaths from disease in the army totaled 
5,502. From October 4 to 11, Camp Lee recorded 220 deaths.45 
By mid-October, 60,000 cases of influenza had been reported to the State Board 
of Health, but officials estimated that the total number exceeded 200,000 (Virginia's 
population in 1920 was approximately 2.3 million). Influenza had appeared from 
southwestern Virginia to the Eastern Shore. At the height of the epidemic, the weekly 
death rate in the nation's cities averaged two to three times higher than normal. In New 
43 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12, 14, 16, 17 October 1918; Andriot, Population 
Abstract of the United States, 828. 
44Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9, 12, 13 October 1918. 
45New York Times, 26 January 1919. 
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England, that number ranged from four to seven times the normal death rate; while in 
Philadelphia and Washington, the rate tripled. The death rate in Richmond and cities 
such as Memphis, Nashville, and Jersey City doubled.46 
In mid-October there were signs that the worst had passed in Richmond. At the 
John Marshall Emergency Hospital, 422 cases of influenza and pneumonia were being 
treated on October 15, but hospital officials reported a decrease in the number of new 
patients. Physicians at John Marshall now had an opportunity to answer cases outside of 
the hospital. Doctors traveled to Hopewell to investigate a high death rate caused by 
acute cases of pneumonia. Physicians and nurses also were sent to areas in the western 
part of the state where influenza remained serious.47 
Dr. Flannagan reported that the influenza epidemic was under control in 
Richmond; however, the number of new cases and deaths continued to increase. By 
October 18, the total number ofreported cases reached 8, 742 and the death toll stood at 
320. Flannagan did not expect the death rate to decline in the immediate future because 
more influenza patients were developing pneumonia. He did hope that those who had 
recovered could help treat the sick and lessen the burden on doctors and nurses. 48 
On October 17, the Newport News Health Office reported ninety-seven deaths 
resulting from influenza or pneumonia. Four days later the number of new cases was 
46 Andriot, Population Abstract of the United States, 820; Richmond Times-
Dispatch, 14 October 1918; New York Times, 26 January 1919. 
41RichmondTimes-Dispatch, 15, 16, 20October1918. 
48Ibid., 17, 19 October 1918. 
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decreasing, but the number of deaths was climbing. Officials estimated the total number 
of deaths at 203. Dr. C.H. Waring, acting head of the USPHS in Newport News, 
revealed that city physicians had reported 1,500 cases to the Health Office. Waring 
estimated that this number was only a fraction of the actual cases that had developed in 
Newport News. Despite the increase in deaths, health officials believed influenza was 
decreasing in the city. If the situation continued to improve, Newport News officials 
planned to lift the ban on public meetings and reopen barber shops, movie theaters, pool 
rooms, churches, and schools before the end of October.49 
Conditions in Roanoke remained critical in mid-October. Over 3,000 cases of 
influenza and over fifty deaths had been recorded by October 19. The severity of the 
pneumonia cases led Roanoke officials to modify policy and designate pneumonia as a 
reportable disease. The city council and the Health Department debated opening an 
emergency hospital in Roanoke and decided that the closed, but equipped, Jefferson 
Hospital could be used if conditions worsened. 50 
Influenza peaked in many eastern cities on the week ending October 19. Almost 
18,000 influenza related deaths were reported in the United States during this week. By 
comparison, influenza deaths had totaled 316 during the second week of September. On 
the week ending October 19, Washington, D.C. reported 621 deaths, New York 4,217, 
and Philadelphia 4,597. During that same week, 197 deaths were reported in 
49Newport News Daily Press, 18, 22 October 1918. 
50Roanoke Times, 20, 23 October 1918. 
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Richmond- a number approximately equal to the city's average monthly death rate from 
all causes. The number of influenza cases recorded during this week totaled 4,717. Since 
the beginning of the month, seventy percent of all deaths were caused by influenza. In 
Richmond the epidemic crested in mid-October, when cases averaged 350 per day and 
the daily death rate hovered around thirty-five. Influenza also began to decline in cities 
including Philadelphia, Washington, Baltimore, Buffalo, Indianapolis, Nashville, and 
Chicago 51 
By October 19, Camp Lee officials no longer considered influenza to be 
epidemic. Out of 16,000 men on the army base, 2,328 soldiers remained hospitalized. 
Over 11,000 influenza cases had developed and 626 deaths had been recorded. By 
October 23, influenza was decreasing in army camps throughout the United States. The 
disease was characterized as epidemic in three camps in Washington, California, and 
Alabama. The military also resumed its draft call after a three-week suspension in areas 
of the nation where influenza had abated and cantonments were regarded as safe. Since 
the epidemic began over 283,000 cases and 14,000 deaths had been reported in the 
camps.52 
The influenza epidemic in Richmond continued to concern officials. While the 
epidemic was improving, approximately 140 cases and over twenty deaths were reported 
51Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23-25 October 1918; A. A. Roehling, The Great 
Epidemic (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 150. 
52Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 October 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 24 
October 1918, New York Times, 23 October 1918. 
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each day during the week ending October 25. Because the situation remained serious in 
the city, Flannagan asked Camp Lee authorities to delay lifting the quarantine against 
Richmond. Camp officials agreed, and soldiers were prohibited from visiting Richmond 
for at least one additional week.53 
At the John Marshall Hospital, 711 people had been admitted by October 24. Dr. 
Stuart Michaux, chief of the medical staff, praised the doctors, nurses, and volunteers for 
the low mortality rates reported at the hospital. As patients were released, hospital 
officials combined wards together to prepare for the reconversion of the building. On 
October 25 the Health Department stopped admitting patients to John Marshall and the 
Baker School. Two hundred patients remained at John Marshall, and 100 individuals 
were at the Baker School. New patients were taken to the Virginia Hospital and the City 
Home or cared for in private residences. By November 1, the staff at John Marshall was 
treating only fifty patients. The death rate of the hospital totaled eleven percent. Thirty-
eight percent of the pneumonia patients treated at the hospital succumbed. Eighty-one 
patients died at John Marshall during the hospital's operation. Officials at the Baker 
School had more difficulty locating facilities to care for the remaining fifty-six patients. 
When Baker closed, 180 individuals had been treated and twenty-four had lost their 
lives.54 Acting School Superintendent A.H. Hill praised the staff of the John Marshall 
and Baker hospitals: "The work done there was wonderful and saved the lives of many 
53 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 October 1918. 
54Ibid., 25, 26 October, 2, 4 November 1918. 
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citizens who became patients, and by taking care of these people it prevented the greater 
spread of this dread disease. "55 
In Newport News, seventy-five patients remained at the Walter Reed Emergency 
Hospital on October 23. Only fifteen of these cases were characterized as serious. At the 
height of the epidemic, doctors and nurses treated 200 patients at this emergency hospital. 
Dr. Waring hesitated to predict when the hospital would be reconverted into a school. He 
promised that before the school was reopened, the building would be disinfected. The 
Newport News School Board planned to proceed cautiously and only open schools when 
there was little chance of a recurrence of the epidemic. Newport News public schools 
would be reopened when the Walter Reed Emergency Hospital closed. A tentative 
opening date was set for November 4, but school officials stated that the scheduled 
reopening could be postponed until November 11. Dr. Waring informed school officials 
that although the epidemic had peaked, he could not predict when the hospital would be 
reconverted. 56 
While schools remained closed in Newport News, city officials lifted the ban on 
public gatherings on October 26. Poolrooms and movie theaters were allowed to reopen; 
however, theater owners were required to ventilate their buildings each morning. The 
Daily Press reported that people waited in lines to see movies and crowded the pool halls 
once the ban was lifted. City officials decided to reopen the public schools on 
55
"Report of the First Assistant Superintendent," 30 June 1919, School Reports, 
1918-1919, Richmond School Board office, Richmond, Virginia, 32. 
56Newport News Daily Press, 23, 24, 26 October 1918. 
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November 11. The fifty patients remaining at Walter Reed would be transferred to other 
facilities. 57 
The State Board of Health supported lifting the bans in communities where the 
epidemic had subsided. The Board advised local officials to proceed with the reopening 
of public places on November 3 ifthe epidemic was no longer serious in their 
communities. Acting State Health Commissioner Garnett developed an "influenza 
catechism" that would be distributed to the schools once they reopened. From this 
publication, children would memorize simple questions and answers relating to influenza 
prevention. The Board continued to warn the public about the dangers associated with 
crowds and urged people to avoid close contact with those who exhibited symptoms of 
influenza. 58 
The number of new influenza cases declined in Richmond during the last week of 
October, but the death rate remained high. Some Richmonders, however, felt that the 
situation had improved enough to consider reopening schools and churches. The 
Richmond Health Department agreed that the influenza epidemic had crested, but refused 
to reopen public institutions.59 Flannagan maintained that a premature decision to reopen 
could jeopardize the health of Richmond residents who had not yet developed influenza. 
57Ibid., 26, 29 October 1918. 
58Ibid., 30, 31October,2 November 1918. 
59Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26, 27 October 1918. 
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He recognized that the situation had improved in the city, but resisted any action that 
could undo this progress: 
I am reminded of the case in Philadelphia. There things were opened up again, 
and they had a secondary epidemic worse than the first. You see things are very 
much better; something has caused it, therefore, we shall not prematurely cease 
doing anything we have been doing, even though we may not know exactly what 
to attribute the improvement to. We shall not open things up this week anyhow, 
and I cannot say when we shall. ... The conditions are greatly improved, but we 
want to stop men dying at such a rate. 60 
Richmond recorded thirteen deaths on October 28. Two days later only seven influenza 
victims succumbed, and Flannagan decided that it was safe to lift the closing restrictions 
on November 3. Because Flannagan anticipated that the number of influenza cases might 
rise after the ban was lifted, he urged that all buildings be kept well ventilated.61 
Richmond residents debated the reopening of city schools, churches, and public 
places. Reverend A. 0. Boda of the North Side Baptist Church suggested that officials 
should not reopen these places until influenza disappeared from Richmond. The 
Richmond Academy of Medicine and Surgery met on October 31 to debate the closing 
issue. The Academy passed a resolution which opposed the reopening of schools and 
public places: 
Considering the disastrous experience of certain cities following a premature 
reopening of public meeting places, it is the part of prudence to postpone further 
the reopening of schools, theaters, churches, and other places of public assembly, 
60Ibid., 26 October 1918. 
61Ibid., 29, 31October1918. 
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until in the opinion of the chief health officer, such reopening will be entirely 
safe.62 
Doctors respectfully urged Flannagan and the Administrative Board to wait at 
least another week before lifting the restrictions. The majority of Academy members 
maintained that because influenza was an airborne illness, segregation of the public was 
the best method of preventing its spread. Dr. E. C. L. Miller, who became director of the 
John Marshall Hospital after Dr. Lawrence Price developed influenza, appeared at the 
meeting and reported that the white and black doctors, nurses, and preachers he had 
spoken to unanimously opposed a premature ban lifting. Dr. Price remarked that two 
Richmond theater owners also supported a continuation of the restrictions. Dr. W. S. 
Gordon believed the epidemic to be unprecedented in American medical history and 
insisted that public places should remain closed for another week. 63 
Several physicians did side with Flannagan and expected that there would be a 
slight increase in the number of influenza cases whenever public places were reopened. 
Dr. Edward McGuire questioned the benefit of the closing restrictions, remarking that the 
number of people who gathered for lunch each day at a Richmond department store was 
greater than those who worshiped at several churches on Sunday. McGuire also 
62Ibid., 31October1918; Minutes of the Richmond Academy of Medicine and 
Surgery, 31October1918, minute book entitled "Minutes: 1908-1927," Richmond 
Academy of Medicine and Surgery, Richmond Virginia. 
63 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 1November1918; Minutes of the Richmond 
Academy of Medicine and Surgery, 31October1918, ibid. 
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Richmond. On this occasion, the board decided to follow Flannagan's recommendations 
and lifted the restrictions that had been in place since October 5.66 
City schools, with the exception of John Marshall and Baker, reopened on 
November 6. Richmond's Acting Superintendent Albert H. Hill emphasized that students 
should not return to school if even a single case of influenza existed at their homes. 
Patients were removed from John Marshall on November 4 and from the Baker School 
the following day. Before they reopened as schools, city officials fumigated the 
buildings. When John Marshall reopened on November 7, sixty-seven percent of 
students were present. The Baker School reopened on November 11.67 
In early November the number of new influenza cases and deaths declined in 
Richmond. On November 14, the Health Department officially stated that the disease 
had subsided. During the five-week period of the epidemic anywhere from 15,000 to 
20,000 people had contracted influenza and approximately 600 had succumbed. The 
closing restrictions had been lifted for over a week, and officials were pleased to note that 
no secondary outbreak had developed. When the Richmond Academy of Medicine and 
Surgery met in late November, a member proclaimed that the epidemic of the previous 
month was "the worst disaster that ever befell the state of Virginia."68 
661bid., 2-4, 8 November 1918. 
67Ibid., 5, 6, 8 November 1918; Minutes of the Richmond School Board, 22 
November 1918, minute book entitled ''November 1916-February 1919," Richmond 
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68Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14, 27 November 1918. 
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Most schools in Virginia reopened by the second week of November. When 
Newport News schools reopened on November 11, after a five-week vacation, students 
had to present certificates from their parents confirming that their homes were free of 
influenza. State Superintendent Harris Hart recommended to local school boards that 
teachers receive full pay for the time missed. He also doubted that the school year would 
be extended due to the large number of students who helped their families on the farm; 
however, school days would be made up by shortening holiday periods.69 
Other localities lifted their closing restrictions in late October and early 
November. Petersburg rescinded its ban and shut down its emergency hospital. The 
town of West Point reopened its schools. Elizabeth City County reopened schools, 
churches, and meeting places on October 31. The Acting Secretary of the County Board 
of Health, Harry Holt, asked the public to continue following precautions against 
influenza. As the number of new influenza cases and deaths decreased, Norfolk health 
authorities lifted their ban on November 1. Physicians had to examine children for signs 
of influenza before they were allowed to return to school. 70 
Roanoke health officials allowed churches to hold one morning service on 
November 3 and permitted normal activities to resume a week later. Theaters and movie 
houses held evening shows on November 4; and poolrooms, bowling alleys, and lodges 
69Newport News Daily Press, 10 November 1918; Roanoke Times, 7 November 
1918. 
70Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3, 5 November 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 27 
October 1918; Roanoke Times, 30 October 1918. 
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reopened that same day. Officials decided that on November 11 schools would be 
reopened and all restrictions would be removed from theaters. Following the partial 
lifting of the ban on November 3 and 4, Roanoke recorded an increase in influenza cases. 
Dr. Foster doubted that the removal of the restrictions was responsible for the increase, 
and speculated that the public may not have been tal<lng necessary precautions. This 
increase proved temporary, however, and influenza and pneumonia cases quickly 
declined in Roanoke. City officials proceeded with the full lifting of the ban, but warned 
the public to guard against influenza for the remainder of the winter.71 
It had been a deadly fall in Virginia. The State Bureau of Vital Statistics reported 
that influenza killed almost 6,000 Virginians in the month of October, though officials 
expected the actual number of deaths to be even higher. Of the reported number of 
deaths, 1,171 individuals were between twenty-five and thirty years old, and 1,041 
victims were between twenty and twenty-five years of age. The number of whites and 
blacks who died equaled 4,139 and 1,832 respectively. The bureau reported that the 
mortality rate among whites and blacks was proportional. 72 
Over 4,000 cases of influenza had been recorded in Roanoke, though health 
authorities considered the number to be higher due to the difficulties associated with the 
official reporting of cases. Ninety-one Roanoke residents had died from Spanish 
influenza in late September and October. Eighty-seven of the 138 deaths recorded in 
71Ibid., 27 October, 5, 7, 9 November 1918. 
721bid., 23 January 1919 
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October were attributed to influenza. In Lynchburg, over 8,000 influenza cases and 267 
deaths had been reported by early November. Richmond officials estimated that 15,000 
to 20,000 influenza cases had developed in the city, and approximately 600 residents had 
died from influenza and pneumonia. In Newport News, 3,500 cases of influenza and 191 
deaths had been recorded in October, but officials estimated the actual total to be two or 
three times greater than the recorded amount. The Daily Press aptly described 
influenza's attack: "The epidemic here took hold quickly and thoroughly, reached its 
peak rapidly, and subsided with equal dispatch."73 
Influenza, according to the New York Times, "made the barracks of this country a 
much more dangerous place than the front in France" during the fall of 1918. The War 
Department reported that approximately 338,000 influenza cases and 17,000 deaths 
occurred in army camps between September 12 and December 1. The number of deaths 
in the army camps from all causes totaled 19,649. A study of the six-month period 
ending on December 27, 1918, found that the death rate in the army had risen from 6.37 
per thousand to 32.13. Officials believed that the high loss of life was due to the age of 
the soldiers and their living conditions. Spanish influenza targeted young, healthy adults 
such as those serving in the military. Furthermore, crowded military housing intensified 
the spread of the flu. The navy, which was ten times smaller than the army, lost a higher 
73Ibid., 10 November 1918, 23 January 1919; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8, 14 
November 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 7 November 1918. 
39 
percentage of its force to influenza. A quarter of the officers and sailors had become ill, 
and 5,000 succumbed to the flu. 74 
A Bureau of the Census study of the forty-six largest American cities determined 
that over 82,000 influenza-related deaths had occurred from September 8 to November 9. 
During that time period, the normal number of deaths resulting from influenza or 
pneumonia equaled 4,000. In the United States the epidemic peaked during the second 
half of October. On the weeks ending October 19 and 26, approximately 41,000 
individuals lost their lives to influenza or pneumonia. According to the census study, 
more Americans died from Spanish influenza than by serving in the American 
Expeditionary Forces, where deaths were estimated at 40,000 to 45,000.75 
74New York Times, 26 January 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 22 December 
1918; Roehling, The Great Epidemic, 186. 
75Roanoke Times, 23January1919; Newport News Daily Press, 8 December 
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CHAPTER3 
THE SECOND OUTBREAK: DECEMBER 1918 
In early December the Public Health Service reported that influenza and 
pneumonia had claimed the lives of at least 300,000 to 350,000 Americans. The 
epidemic had not run its course, however, and influenza began to reappear in many 
sections of the country.1 Surgeon General Rupert Blue recommended that schools close 
when the first signs of a second epidemic appeared. Blue warned the public to remain on 
guard: "Any statement at the present time that the epidemic has 'come and gone for 
good' can only do harm, for it will lull the people into a false sense of security and cause 
them to relax the precautions they should take to avoid the infection."2 He urged the 
public to continue following safeguards such as covering coughs and sneezes. As reports 
of a second outbreak emerged, the New York Times called on the nation's health officials 
to take action: ''what would be the pleasantest reading of all would be announcements of 
preparations to prevent another affliction of this sort and a vigorous education of the 
public and the medical profession in whatever means science provides for protecting us 
from another desolating plague like the one which has just 'burnt itself out. "'3 
1Newport News Daily Press, 5December1918. 
2 Roanoke Times, 17 December 1918. 
3New York Times, 14 December 1918. 
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Influenza seemed to have disappeared from Newport News in November. During 
that month, the city recorded only one case of pneumonia. The next month, however, the 
illness reemerged. Thirty-eight influenza cases had been reported to health officials by 
December 11. Two days later, USPHS officials uncovered sixty-one additional cases that 
doctors had not reported. Captain C.H. Waring, head of the Public Health Service in 
Newport News, criticized physicians for their failure to report these cases. He stated that 
if health officials were to halt the spread of influenza, they needed to have an accurate 
count of new cases as they occurred. The Daily Press also urged doctors to be more 
vigilant when reporting cases of influenza to health authorities. Because influenza was 
milder than it had been in October, Waring doubted that schools, churches, and theaters 
would be closed. Over 600 influenza cases had been reported by December 17, but the 
number of deaths had risen to only seven.4 
Newport News officials disagreed over whether or not to reinstate the closing 
ordinance. Mayor A. A. Moss supported a closing order, but could not enact one unless 
advised to do so by health authorities. Newport News Health Officer, Dr. W. F. Cooper, 
maintained that this outbreak was not serious enough to justify a ban on public 
gatherings. 5 The Daily Press described the debate between those who believed that the 
4Newport News Daily Press, 30 November, 12, 14, 15, 18 December 1918. 
5Ibid., 28 December 1918. 
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second outbreak was milder than the first and those who maintained that it was just as 
deadly. According to the editors, the latter: 
would have us again become a closed town. They would have soft-drinkless days 
and churchless Sundays and the old trouble of school-less children under foot at 
home. They would deny us 'movies' and keep the young sport from practicing 
draw shots on pool tables, and in all and sundry have us curl up and try the 
blighting effects of passivism on a relentless foe.6 
Elizabeth City County re-closed schools during the second epidemic. No one 
under the age of sixteen could attend church or movie theaters. Officials also prohibited 
the use of public drinking cups and recommended that adults avoid crowds. After an 
increase in influenza among the young, the Norfolk Health Commissioner, Powhatan 
Schenk, closed public schools and prohibited children under fifteen from attending 
church, Sunday school, or movies. 7 
Influenza reappeared in Richmond in late November when a Richmond medical 
inspector and a team of nurses discovered fifty unreported cases of influenza in Ginter 
Park. Flannagan investigated the new cases and recommended that the Ginter Park 
Public School be closed. Despite his advice to close this school, Flannagan considered 
the influenza cases in Ginter Park to be milder than those that appeared in October. 
Because this outbreak was affecting mostly children, he also expected the death rate to be 
lower.8 
6Ibid., 27 December 1918. 
7Ibid., 13, 14 December 1918. 
8Richmond Times-Dispatch, 19, 21, 22 November 1918. 
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By the end of November a second, though milder, outbreak of influenza seemed 
to be underway in Richmond. On November 29, fifty cases were reported. The 
following day ninety-six additional cases appeared-the most since the epidemic's crest 
in October. On December 2, over 200 new cases and three deaths were recorded. Many 
cases had developed in the West End where it was reported that wealthier residents who 
had been spared during the first epidemic were now becoming ill. In the North Side, 
however, a decrease in influenza cases led to the reopening of the Ginter Park School.9 
On December 9, Richmond recorded over 400 new cases and eleven deaths. 
Although this was a large number of new cases, the Health Department believed the 
increase had resulted from physicians reporting backlogged cases from the past week. 
On December 10, the number of new cases had declined to 155. Still, there was little 
doubt that a second epidemic had begun. Authorities were not surprised by the 
reappearance of influenza in Richmond and stated that it was normal for the disease to 
linger. During the period between December 8 and December 12, 1,365 cases were 
reported in Richmond- the largest number since the week ending October 19. Over 
2,000 cases and 120 deaths had been recorded since the second outbreak began. While 
influenza was less deadly, officials continued to urge the public to follow precautions 
against the illness. 10 
9Ibid., 1, 3 December 1918. 
10Ibid., 10, 11, 13, 14 December 1918. 
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At Richmond public schools, the re-emergence of influenza led to the absences of 
many teachers and students. School officials did not allow teachers or students to attend 
school unless the Board of Health or a family doctor reported that their homes were free 
of influenza. By December 13, one-third of the 24,000 students were absent, as were 
sixty-eight teachers. Due to a shortage of substitutes, classes were combined and 
teachers from the closed Ginter Park School were sent to other city schools. 11 
Dr. T. W. Murrell, president of the Richmond Academy of Medicine and 
Surgery, worried that the public was not treating the second outbreak of influenza as 
seriously as the first. At a special meeting of the Academy held on December 13, Dr. 
McGuire Newton reported that influenza now was more serious among children. He 
maintained that many of these children had contracted influenza at school.12 The 
Academy stated that it was "mere speculation and personal opinion" to connect the re-
emergence of influenza to the reopening of public places. The physicians admitted that 
they felt a heavy burden in prescribing the course of action to be followed by the public: 
"We are not looking at this with unprejudiced eyes. Our loved ones, intimate friends, are 
dying, and we stand by heart-tom and desperate in being unable to render the aid they 
11Ibid., 10, 14 December 1918; "Report of Acting Superintendent A.H. Hill to the 
Richmond School Board," Minutes of the Richmond School Board, 19 December 1918, 
minute book entitled ''November 1916-February 1919," Richmond School Board office, 
Richmond, Virginia, 370. 
12Richrnond Times-Dispatch, 13, 14 December 1918. 
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look to us to give." The members of the association concluded that because influenza was 
spread by personal contact, the only true safeguard was the avoidance of this contact. 13 
The Academy recommended that Richmond close its public and Sunday schools. 
Richmond Public School Acting Superintendent A.H. Hill and school physician Dr. T. 
N. Ennett opposed this decision believing children would be safer at school than at home. 
Dr. J. Fulmer Bright also argued against school closings: "True there will be some empty 
cradles, but the education of humanity must not be stopped." Dr. Murrell, however, 
strongly believed that the health of children must take priority: "Rather than have my 
cradle empty, I would advocate the closing of schools for a thousand years, and I feel that 
my duty as a physician demands that I protect the cradles of other fathers." While the 
Academy supported the school closings, its members chose not to recommend the closing 
of all public places.14 
Flannagan disagreed with the recommendations of the Richmond Academy of 
Medicine. He reported that public health officials who met at a conference in Chicago 
had concluded that school closings did little to reduce the number of cases or halt the 
spread of the epidemic. Flannagan believed that schools helped educate students about 
influenza. If medical inspection was implemented in schools, students would be safer 
than at their homes, where they might be unsupervised. Furthermore, schools offered 
13Minutes of the Richmond Academy of Medicine and Surgery, 13 December 
1918, minute book entitled "Minutes: 1908 - 1927," Richmond Academy of Medicine 
and Surgery, Richmond, Virginia. 
14Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14 December 1918. 
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protection for students who lived in crowded sections of Richmond. If they believed 
their homes were safer, parents could choose not to send their children to school. 
Flannagan recommended that schools remain open, and the Administrative Board 
supported his decision. 15 
By mid-December the second epidemic in Richmond was peaking. Flannagan 
continued to warn the public to avoid crowded public places, especially the poorly 
ventilated shops on Broad Street. By Christmas, the second epidemic had waned. As 
1918 came to a close, 1,126 influenza-related deaths had occurred, and 20,481 cases of 
influenza had been reported since the beginning of the epidemic in Richmond. 16 
Roanoke also experienced a secondary epidemic in late November. On 
November 28 and 29, over one hundred new cases were recorded in the city. To contain 
this new outbreak, the Health Department quarantined infected homes. Officials 
placarded the front doors of these houses, warning the occupants not to leave and 
preventing visitors from entering. The Health Department urged these families to isolate 
the sick from the rest of the household. Above all, the public was instructed to continue 
following the publicized precautions against influenza.17 According to the Roanoke 
Times, local authorities recalled that after the passing of the October outbreak "there was 
15Ibid., 16, 17, 20 December 1918. 
16Ibid., 21, 24December1918, 1January1919. 
17Roanoke Times, 30 November, 3 December 1918. 
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a very apparent tendency on the part of the average citizen to cast aside all restraints upon 
his actions and try to forget there ever was such a thing as the 'flu. "'18 
Dr. Foster hesitated to close schools and theaters again, and instead asked the 
public to voluntarily avoid public places and crowds. City authorities did issue special 
precautions to be observed in the Roanoke public schools. Principals had to inquire 
about the health of their teachers and prevent those with influenza symptoms from 
working. Teachers were to observe their students for signs of illness and exclude the sick 
or those from infected homes from school. Furthermore, the school buildings were to be 
heated in the mornings, and windows were to be opened at certain times of the day to 
ensure proper ventilation. In early December, absenteeism among teachers and students 
was high due to illness or the quarantine of individual households. 19 
From December 1 to 11, 714 cases of influenza and twenty-eight cases of 
pneumonia were recorded in Roanoke. To expedite the reporting of cases, the Health 
Department mailed local physicians printed post-cards to fill out and return. One 
Roanoke physician regarded the influenza outbreak as more harmful than a smallpox 
epidemic and believed that the public had dismissed the seriousness of the situation. On 
December 13, Roanoke officials closed schools, churches, theaters, and other meeting 
places for the second time.20 
18Ibid., 28 December 1918. 
19Ibid., 30 November, 3, 5 December 1918. 
20Ibid., 5, 11, 12 December 1918. 
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The reissuing of the ban was unpopular with those who earned their livelihoods in 
the city's theaters and poolrooms. Allen Jenkins who managed the Bijou and Comet 
theaters vowed to open despite the closing ordinance. He questioned why schools, 
churches, and public places were closed, while crowded shops remained opened. 
Jenkins insisted that the Board of Health and the City Council favored the Retail 
Merchants Association of Roanoke. He supported a stringent quarantine of homes to 
combat influenza and believed that stores were more dangerous to the public than 
theaters: 
Go at the epidemic at its source, the homes of the city. Don't try to dam it at the 
mouth by shutting up the churches, schools, theaters, etc., and leaving a waterway 
in the congested stores of the city. The health department is turning upon the 
street a vast crowd of men, women, and children, who will seek companionship 
during their fright. They will find it at each other's homes, in the stores, and 
anywhere that one or two more can congregate. With the strict regulations in 
force in the schools and theaters regarding ventilation and sanitation they would 
be far better off at those places.21 
Jenkins insisted that he was not trying to defy the authorities, but only wished to 
test the validity of the closing ordinance. When Jenkins voluntarily appeared at a 
Roanoke Police Court, he reported that business at his theaters was brisk throughout the 
day and night. Several pool halls also remained opened. After refusing to close his 
poolroom, Joseph Hanna was issued a summons to appear in court. Like Jenkins, Hanna 
faulted officials for allowing congested retail stores to remain open. Pool hall operators, 
including Hanna, appeared at the Police Court, only to have their cases postponed.22 
21Ibid., 13 December 1918. 
22Ibid., 12-14 December 1918. 
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M.A. Smith, Vice-President of the National Business College in Roanoke, also 
criticized the Health Department's policy. Smith believed that health officials displayed 
bias by meeting with the Retail Merchants but not the owners of the public places they 
closed. Smith had supported the closing of his college in October when a number of 
students were ill, but now that his institution was free of influenza, he argued that the 
ordinance was unwise. Smith pressed for a more rigorous enforcement of the quarantine 
and questioned the policy of the Health Department: 
The idea of closing a few places as 'constant reminders' to the people that they 
must be more careful is fundamentally wrong. This appears a case of allowing 
menacing individuals to freely go their way through the stores, offices, shops, and 
streets, scattering disease germs, while the well people, who have observed safe 
and sanitary re~ulations are made to sufTer financial loss and personal 
inconvenience. 3 
A group of ministers also criticized the closing ordinance, though they agreed to 
cooperate with city officials. A. W. Brooks, pastor of a Baptist church in Roanoke, 
repeated the assertion that authorities were favoring the retailers at the expense of other 
groups. He also took ofTense with the grouping of churches with "nonessential" 
businesses such as movie theaters and bowling alleys. Brooks asked how a church 
service lasting one hour per week could be more harmful to public health than the retail 
stores, banks, and factories that opened each day. He also questioned the necessity of the 
second round of closings: "If conditions arc so serious why not quarantine e\'el)1hing? 
... If not serious enough to close commercial institutions, then why close the churches 
23Ibid., 13 December 1918. 
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and leave the impress that the people of Roanoke can get along without God, but cannot 
get along without money-worship."24 
Joseph W. Coxe, chairman of the Board of Health, acknowledged that the city's 
shopping district was overcrowded in the afternoons. He urged the public to avoid 
crowds by shopping in the morning and limiting the number of trips to stores. The city 
council apologized for the inconveniences or financial losses caused by the closing 
ordinance, but warned that violations of the order would not be tolerated. Regarding the 
crowded retail stores, Dr. Foster instructed owners to ventilate their stores throughout the 
Christmas season. Woolworth stores in Roanoke joined the cause by distributing cards 
describing influenza prevention. 25 
On December 16 the Roanoke Board of Health and the city council agreed to 
rescind the closing ordinance. Officials planned to lift the ban in two days, though 
restrictions on certain public places remained in effect. While public schools remained 
closed until after Christmas, the National Business College was allowed to reopen. 
Health inspectors continued to visit the school to ensure that regulations were being 
followed. Churches, but not Sunday schools, reopened, and no social gatherings were 
allowed in church buildings. Funerals were to be held at cemeteries or in homes if 
necessary. City officials still prohibited public dances and social events in Roanoke.26 
24Ibid., 15 December 1918. 
25Ibid., 13, 14, 18 December 1918. 
26Ibid., 17 December 1918. 
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Pool halls, bowling alleys, and movie theaters reopened on December 18, but 
health authorities still placed restrictions on these businesses. Managers of pool halls and 
bowling alleys were required to limit the number of people that could congregate at 
individual pool tables and bowling lanes. Theaters were not allowed to be more than 
two-thirds full. No one under fifteen years of age could patronize a movie theater, and 
theaters had to close for one hour each evening for cleaning and ventilation. The Board of 
Health's new policy did not satisfy critics like Allen Jenkins. Jenkins continued to argue 
that Roanoke officials had discriminated against theater owners: "the picture men regret 
they are not members of the Retail Merchants' Association, as it is very evident that the 
merchants are not restricted in any way and the picture shows I represent will continue 
fighting for their rights unless like restrictions arc placed on all lines of business."27 
The Roanoke Times implored the public to heed the advice of the Health 
Department. The editors reminded their readers of the gravity of this unprecedented 
epidemic and appealed for cooperation: "It is a serious menace that the health authorities 
are combating and they are not open to reproach because it is evident- sometimes 
glaringly evident- that they are somewhat uncertain themselves as to just what is the 
best way to go about the tasks of checking its ravages."28 Concerned about the 
congested retail stores, Dr. Foster urged the public to shop early in the day to help limit 
afternoon crowds. He also encouraged people to shop alone and advised parents not to 
27Ibid., 17 December 1918. 
28Ibid. 
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bring their children to the stores. Business owners cooperated with Foster in reducing 
crowds in their stores. Some displayed signs requesting that customers conduct their 
transactions quickly. Managers and the police also discouraged people from loitering in 
these public places. Foster personally inspected some of the more crowded stores and 
conferred with managers about methods of limiting congesting and providing for better 
ventilation. 29 
As December came to a close, the influenza epidemic subsided in Roanoke. The 
number of influenza cases reported during November and December totaled 1,033 and 
1,679, respectively. The number of deaths reported during December totaled sixty, 
compared to the eighty-six deaths reported in October. Influenza continued to be 
reported throughout January. Roanoke recorded 553 flu cases and twenty-three deaths 
that month. Since the epidemic began in September, over 7,000 cases of influenza had 
been reported to Roanoke health authorities.30 
Influenza continued to plague parts of Virginia in early 1919. The illness 
reappeared in Charlottesville and Luray in January. That same month, Petersburg 
reported an increase in influenza cases. The acuteness of influenza in Hot Springs led the 
State Council of Defense to dispatch doctors to a local hospital. The Elizabeth City 
County Board of Health did not reopen schools until January 20. During the second 
29Ibid., 18, 19 December 1918. 
301bid., 28, 31 December 1918, 5, 14 January, 4 February 1919. 
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outbreak, schools in Hampton, Phoebus, and Elizabeth City County were closed for six 
weeks.31 
As Spanish influenza abated, Americans began to put the epidemic into 
perspective. The New York Times compared the disease to the plagues of olden time: "to 
find a mortality approaching that caused by this visitation it would be necessary to go 
back to the days when preventative medicine was in its infancy and sanitation was 
regarded as the troublesome fad of a few absurdly timid people- to the days of cholera, 
yellow fever, and typhoid."32 The Times also criticized physicians like New York Health 
Commissioner Dr. Copeland, who at the start of the epidemic had reassured the public 
that Spanish influenza would be of small concern to the United States: "The doctors 
proved themselves the worst of prophets when they told us that the malady would have 
little or no power over a well-fed population, for when it came its favorable victims were 
the young and the strong, while the weak, at both extremities of life, were almost 
immune. "33 
In September 1919, the State Health Commissioner revealed that over 326,000 
cases of influenza had been reported in Virginia since the epidemic began the previous 
31Robert P. Valentine to Vinton Valentine, 30 December 1918; Ella Katherine 
Fife to Margaret Whitler Fife, 15 January 1919, Box 2, Freudenberg correspondence; 
Mabel Menefee to Marvin Menefee, 1January1919, Papers of Marvin J. Menefee, 1914-
82, Alderman Library, University of Virginia. Hereinafter cited as Menefee papers; 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 5, 25 January 1919; Newport News Daily Press, 18 January 
1919. 
32New York Times, 2 December 1918. 
33Ibid., 7, 14 December 1918. 
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fall. According to the State Board of Health, influenza killed more than 11,000 residents, 
while over 2,000 Virginians lost their lives to pneumonia (see table 1 ). The number of 
influenza-related deaths published in the newspapers during the epidemic often exceeded 
the official totals. Due to the problems associated with the reporting of cases, the actual 
number of influenza and pneumonia deaths in Virginia probably was higher than the 
official count.34 
According to mortality statistics from the Bureau of Census, influenza and 
pneumonia killed 17,064 Virginians during the last four months of 1918 and the first six 
months of 1919. Influenza-related deaths in 1918 in the twenty-four states included in 
the census statistics averaged 6.0 per 1,000 people. By comparison, the 1917 death rate 
due to influenza and pneumonia was 1.7 per 1,000. The 1918 influenza-related death rate 
in Virginia was 6.2 per 1,000 people, compared to 1.4 per 1,000 in 1917. Richmond's 
influenza-related death rate rose from 2.0 per 1,000 in 1917 to 6.6 per 1,000 in 1918. 
Among the states included in the census statistics, Pennsylvania (8.8 per 1,000) and 
Maryland (8.0 per 1,000) had the highest influenza-related death rates in 1918. The 
lowest death rates were found in Michigan and Minnesota (3.9 per 1,000).35 
The president of the Actuarial Society of America, Henry Moir, estimated that 
influenza had killed 400,000 Americans. Moir's study of statistics from seven life 
insurance companies revealed some interesting findings. Of all reported influenza-
34Annual Report of the State Board of Health, 7, 156-161. 
35Bureau of Census, Mortality Statistics, 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1921 ), 28-31, in Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 208-214. 
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related deaths, thirteen percent resulted from influenza and eighty-seven percent were 
caused by pneumonia. Moir found that the average age of death was thirty-three, and 
projected that an average of twenty-five years of active life had been lost in each case. 
Census statistics from the nation's forty-six largest cities found that the death rate in 1918 
equaled 19.6 per thousand. The rate in Boston climbed from 16.4 in 1917 to 22.0 in 
1918. In Philadelphia, the total increased from 17.1 to 24.2; while in Washington, D.C., 
the death rate rose from 16.8 to 23.6. In four months, more Americans died from Spanish 
influenza than had been killed in nineteen months of war.36 
36New York Times, 6 December 1918, 6 January 1919; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
13 February 1919. 
CHAPTER4 
THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLUENZA: DOCTORS, NURSES, AND 
VOLUNTEERS 
When influenza emerged in the fall of 1918, American communities quickly 
realized that they lacked resources to fight the epidemic. There was a severe shortage of 
doctors and nurses due to the war in Europe. Federal, state, and local officials pleaded 
for volunteers to battle influenza. Women were called upon to care for the sick and 
perform other duties related to the epidemic. Many cities had to open emergency 
hospitals to treat the growing number of patients. Organizations such as the Red Cross 
concentrated all efforts on influenza. These volunteers and charitable groups played a 
vital role in the fight against influenza. 
Cities in Virginia had to devise ways to deal with the lack of medical personnel. 
The Newport News Daily Press commented on the scarcity of doctors in the nation. The 
editors of the paper argued that the United States should exempt some physicians from 
military service so that they could attend to the health of the homefront: 
Contrary to the general opinion, we have never been overstocked with doctors, 
and since the war the supply has been woefully limited. Medical men are acutely 
needed in private practice, not only to meet epidemics like the influenza, but to 
preserve and maintain and educate in health standards that are vitally necessary at 
home .... An epidemic in the United States affects in ten thousand ways the 
comfort and efficiency of the army in France. And a doctor who is engaged in 
protecting the home base certainly is doing a direct service to that on foreign soil.1 
1Newport News Daily Press, 10 October 1918. 
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Due to the lack of doctors and nurses, Surgeon General Rupert Blue of the 
USPHS urged the public to become familiar with the home care of influenza patients, 
rather than rely solely on medical professionals: "The present generation has been spoiled 
by having had expert medical and nursing care readily available. While I cheerfully 
recognize all the good that has been done by our splendidly trained graduate nurses, I 
believe that the public generally has come to rely too much on their services and has not 
interested itself in studying the home care of the sick. "2 
Richmond officials divided the city into four districts so that doctors could better 
locate and treat the sick. The Richmond Academy of Medicine instructed its physicians 
to practice only general medicine during the epidemic and to accept all calls from 
influenza patients. Dr. Roy Flannagan estimated that overworked Richmond physicians 
had reported one-third of the actual number of cases. Roanoke also faced a shortage of 
doctors. Before the epidemic, forty percent of local physicians had joined the military. 
Health officials asked for cooperation during the epidemic. They instructed the public to 
call for doctors in the morning and limit night calls to emergencies.3 
To treat influenza patients in locales lacking medical facilities, the State Board of 
Health and the State Council of Defense operated hospital trains that carried the sick to 
towns with emergency hospitals. The Board of Health and the Council of Defense also 
opened emergency hospitals in places where there was an urgent need for medical 
2Ibid., 13 October 1918. 
3 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8, 9, 14 October 1918; Roanoke Times, 8 October 
1918. 
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facilities. The great demand for physicians led State Health Commissioner Dr. Ennion 
Williams to ask Surgeon General Blue for permission to use Medical College of Virginia 
students as "doctor-assistants." These third and fourth year MCV students were 
dispatched throughout the state to treat influenza patients. The State Board of Health sent 
doctors, including the medical students, to thirty-five localities that requested physicians. 
Surgeon General Blue also provided doctors from the USPHS. The Public Health 
Service used some of the funds appropriated by Congress to pay these physicians and 
medical students. In January the Surgeon General of the Army agreed to furlough some 
doctors from army camps in Virginia and send them to areas of the state where their 
services were needed.4 
Due to the lack of medical care in southwestern Virginia, the State Board of 
Health sent Dr. Paul Barringer to educate the public about influenza in the railroad 
centers and coal towns of this region. Barringer supported a ban on assemblies and 
worried about the epidemic's effects: "No national disaster that we can conceive would 
be more far-reaching than a serious let-down in the output of coal at this time."5 There 
was an urgent need for physicians in the towns of Covington, Norton, and Saltville. An 
official from the Virginia Council of Defense and the state Federal Fuel Administrator 
asked the federal government to send doctors and nurses to southwestern Virginia where 
4Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9, 12, 14 October 1918; Annual Report of the State 
Board of Health, 7; Roanoke Times, 12January1919. 
5 Annual Report of the State Board of Health, 6; Dr. R. B. Barringer to Judge 
Henry C. McDowell, excerpted in C. C. Cochran to Westmoreland Davis, 7 October 
1918, Box 14, Davis Executive Papers. 
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influenza had paralyzed the coal industry. United States Fuel Administration 
representative G.D. Kilgore reported that coal production was crippled in the region. He 
praised the State Board of Health for their help in opening emergency hospitals and 
operating the relief trains in the towns of Southwest Virginia.6 
Dr. W. A. Brumfield of the Public Health Service reported that the influenza 
epidemic was very serious in Lee County: "Conditions at St. Charles could not well be 
worse. The great majority of the people are sick and the rest are panic-stricken and 
completely disorganized. It is said that the sick and the children in some houses are 
suffering for food because there is no one able to prepare it."7 Brumfield noted that the 
town of Coeburn had established a hospital. He began to organize relief work in the area 
and planned to create a soup kitchen in the town. A nurse from the John Marshall 
Emergency Hospital was dispatched to assist Dr. Brumfield with his work. Brumfield 
informed the State Board of Health that the influenza situation remained critical in small 
communities throughout Southwest Virginia.8 
To make matters worse, the appearance of diphtheria in St. Charles led Brumfield 
to fear that this disease might spread to other areas of the state. Diphtheria was a serious 
problem in Lee County, and the State Board of Health took measures to prohibit its 
transmission outside of southwestern Virginia. Acting on behalf of State Health 
6Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14, 17 October 1918; G.D. Kilgore to Westmoreland 
Davis, 15, 18 October 1918, Box 14, ibid. 
7Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 October 1918. 
8Ibid. 
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Commissioner Williams, who was ill, Dr. R. W. Garnett sent instructions to all Virginia 
physicians warning them to watch carefully for symptoms of diphtheria: "Considering the 
unprecedented demands being made upon the time and energy of doctors, it would not be 
surprising if cases of diphtheria were overlooked."9 
Twelve USPHS doctors, eighteen of their assistants, and thirty-four civilian 
physicians were available to treat the sick in Newport News. Newport News Mayor A. 
A. Moss asked the Secretaries of War and the Navy to allow four local doctors to remain 
in Newport News instead of being inducted into the military as planned. Dr. C.H. 
Waring, acting head of the USPHS in Newport News, issued a set of instructions to 
reduce the demand for doctors and nurses. The public was asked to call physicians only 
in case of an emergency. When house calls were needed, the visit was scheduled for the 
following morning so that doctors could organize their trips according to geographic 
location. Waring urged the public to release private nurses so that they could assist the 
Public Health Service. He also recommended that only the most serious cases be 
admitted to a hospital. 10 
State health officials received constant requests for nurses. There was a great 
demand for nurses in rural areas where the fear of influenza made some residents 
reluctant to care for the sick. To ease the demand, the Board of Health sent county 
extension agents with nursing experience to areas where they were needed. Flannagan 
9Ibid, 20, 22 October 1918. 
10Newport News Daily Press, 4, 8, 12 October 1918. 
61 
and State Health Commissioner Williams addressed a group of graduate and practical 
nurses in hopes of recruiting them to aid in the battle against influenza. The Richmond 
Health Department also urged married women to volunteer for a few hours each day. 11 
Treating influenza patients was dangerous work for doctors and nurses. At one 
point, four of five Richmond Health Department physicians were confined to their beds. 
The assistant director of the John Marshall Emergency Hospital, Dr. E. C. L. Miller, 
became hospital director when Dr. Lawrence Price developed influenza. Dr. R. W. 
Garnett served as Acting State Health Commissioner while Dr. Ennion Williams was ill. 
Dr. Charles R. Robbins worked for four days at John Marshall before he became sick. 
Nurses often developed influenza after caring for patients. Grace D. Morris, a twenty-
six-year-old senior nurse at Virginia Hospital in Richmond, died after an eight-day bout 
with influenza and pneumonia.12 
The difficulty in locating doctors and nurses was accompanied by an 
overcrowding of hospitals throughout the state. Some communities chose to open 
emergency hospitals to treat serious influenza cases. In early October, Public Health 
Service representatives recommended that an emergency hospital be opened in Newport 
News. City officials agreed and initially planned to convert a tabernacle into an 
emergency hospital. While the city was given permission to use the tabernacle, a tour 
revealed that it would take too long to convert the building into a hospital. Dr. Waring, 
11Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3, 14 October 1918. 
12Ibid., 10, 11, 16, 19 October 1918; Annual Report of the State Board of Health, 
7. 
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the Public Health Service representative, inspected other buildings before deciding on the 
Walter Reed School. The Newport News School Board agreed to let the USPHS use the 
school as a temporary emergency hospital. 13 
The Public Health Service pledged to provide administrators, doctors, and nurses 
to staff the hospital. The local Red Cross chapter donated $5,000 to pay for nurses and 
supplies at the hospital. The city of Newport News contributed an equal amount towards 
the operation of Walter Reed. The Newport News shipyard, the U.S. Housing 
Corporation, and the Old Dominion Land Company also helped fund the hospital. 
Officials from Newport News, the Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, the shipyard, 
and the Old Dominion Land Company organized the Walter Reed Emergency Hospital 
Association to manage the facility's business affairs. 14 
Dr. Samuel W. Hobson, a member of the State Board of Health and a physician at 
the Newport News Shipyard and the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, believed that sending 
influenza patients to hospitals like Walter Reed would worsen their condition. Dr. 
Hobson stated that the seriously ill could infect the mildly ill when grouped together. He 
advocated the dispersion and isolation of influenza patients: "Dispersion may seem a 
hardship on many households, but it is a hardship they should have the heroism and 
nobility of character to bear, for it is unthinkable that they would force their guests into 
the pneumonia sprays of hospitals or other concentration depots for purveying infection." 
13Newport News Daily Press, 4-6 October 1918. 
14Ibid., 4, 5, 9, 11October1918. 
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Hobson advised influenza patients to remain in their beds for several days and proposed 
the construction of special hospitals where pneumonia patients could be completely 
isolated from each other. 15 
Dr. Waring insisted that influenza patients were safer in emergency hospitals like 
Walter Reed than in congested and poorly ventilated homes. He informed the public that 
influenza and pneumonia patients were treated in separate wards. Cots were partitioned 
with large screens, items that patients came in contact with were disinfected, patients 
received proper nutrition and medicine, and the hospital prohibited visitors. Furthermore, 
Waring argued that concentration of the sick was preferable to dispersal because doctors 
and nurses could treat more patients in a central hospital like Walter Reed. 16 
The Walter Reed Hospital was opened on October 6, and by the next day fifty 
patients were being treated at the facility. The hospital staff planned to accommodate up 
to 250 patients within two weeks. Orily the most serious cases would be treated at the 
emergency hospital. Patients without family in Newport News would be given 
preference over those with relatives in the city. Newport News residents were charged 
$1.50 per day, while non-residents paid a dollar more. Indigents were not assessed a 
fee. 17 
15Jbid., 9 October 1918. 
16Ibid., 10 October 1918. 
17Ibid., 6, 8, 9, 11 October 1918. 
64 
Walter Reed needed additional nurses, untrained male and female attendants, and 
cooks to care for the growing number of patients. The Newport News superintendent of 
schools requested that teachers volunteer to work either as nurses or clerical assistants. 
The hospital staff and health officials appealed to the heroism and self-sacrifice of 
Newport News residents. The public was asked to donate hospital supplies such as 
pillows, sheets, and bedding. On October 12, over 170 patients were at Walter Reed. 
Unable to admit more people due to the shortage of nurses, hospital officials pleaded with 
the women ofNewport News to volunteer even if they had no nursing experience. 18 
Three days later, the demand for nurses had decreased and the hospital was caring 
for almost 200 patients. Ten individuals had died at Walter Reed-the majority of the 
deaths resulting from pneumonia. By October 17, however, five nurses had developed 
influenza, leaving only six nurses to treat more than 200 patients. Hospital officials sent 
twenty individuals to Norfolk hospitals due to the nursing shortage at Walter Reed. 
Newport News health officials repeated their pleas for women to volunteer at the 
emergency hospital. Volunteer attendants who could work during the night continued to 
be in demand. While the hospital quickly obtained a sufficient number of attendants, the 
five nurses who had become ill were not replaced. 19 
As the epidemic in Newport News abated in late October, plans were made to 
move patients out of Walter Reed and convert the building back into a school. The Daily 
18Ibid., 9, 11, 13 October 1918. 
19Ibid., 16, 18-20 October 1918. 
65 
Press praised the doctors, nurses, and volunteers who treated influenza victims. The 
paper questioned if the city could cope without an emergency hospital in the future, 
especially if another epidemic emerged: "The Spanish influenza invasion found the city 
utterly unprepared, and one of our best schoolhouses had to be pressed into service for a 
hospital. But what shall we do next time? Shall we wait for another emergency to arise, 
or shall we take counsel of our experience and prepare in advance?"20 A city council 
member proposed that funds left over from the operation of Walter Reed be applied to the 
construction of a permanent emergency hospital in Newport News.21 
Richmond officials also combated influenza by opening an emergency hospital 
for serious cases. The John Marshall Hospital was equipped to handle up to 700 patients 
but lacked doctors and nurses. Because only four physicians initially worked at the 
hospital, Dr. Price urged Richmond doctors to volunteer even if it was for only one hour 
each day. Ten graduate nurses and volunteers with prior nursing experience staffed the 
emergency hospital, but Price called for more nurses: "It is urgently requested that all 
persons not seriously ill and using the services of a nurse will release her at once, so that 
she may report here for duty. If the situation is not relieved from a nursing standpoint, it 
will be necessary to commandeer the services of nurses doing less important work. "22 
20Ibid., 29 October 1918. 
21Ibid., 6 November 1918. 
22Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9 October 1918. 
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By October 10 the John Marshall Hospital was caring for 200 patients, but only 
three nurses were available to work each shift. The executive staff of the hospital and the 
Richmond Administrative Board met with Attorney-General John R. Saunders to discuss 
the legality of commandeering nurses to work in the hospital. Agnes Randolph called on 
nurses tending convalescents to aid with the more urgent cases: "A spirit of patriotism 
should cause the people to tum over their nurses to the hospital as soon as humanely 
possible. "23 Graduate nurses were offered a salary of forty dollars per week, while 
trained attendants were paid twenty-five dollars.24 
On October 11, a group of prominent Richmond physicians informed the public 
that the hospital had sufficient medical supplies and ambulance service, but the nursing 
staff was inadequate. The doctors asked recent graduates and trained nurses to volunteer, 
and also urged women and men of both races who had no nursing experience to help at 
the hospital. These individuals could perform simple tasks, while the trained nurses 
attended to the patients. 25 
Some prominent Richmond residents responded to the calls for helps. Governor 
Westmoreland Davis visited the hospital, and his wife worked in the pneumonia ward. 
Maggie Walker, the African-American president of St. Luke's Penny Savings Bank, 
arrived with three friends to volunteer at the hospital. A nurse and two of her students 
23Ibid., 11 October 1918. 
24Ibid., 12 October 1918. 
25Ibid. 
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from Grace Hospital joined the staff at John Marshall and planned to work full time, 
taking breaks only to .sleep and eat. The brotherhood of Saint Andrews Church and a 
number of Catholic sisters also offered to work at John Marshall. 26 
Teachers throughout the nation and Virginia joined the fight against the influenza 
epidemic. With the schools closed, administrators and teachers who were not ill 
volunteered their services. Dr. Miller, a MCV professor and a physician at the John 
Marshall Emergency Hospital, praised the teachers who volunteered as "capable, brainy, 
and efficient." In addition to working as nurses, teachers visited families in their 
districts, gave the sick first aid, and reported new cases to the health authorities. School 
clerks worked overtime at the John Marshall offices, school mechanics converted rooms 
into emergency facilities, and the domestic science department and elementary school 
teachers prepared the hospital's food. The Richmond School Board car was used solely 
for the purpose of answering emergency calls. Superintendent Hill reported that 4 77 
public school teachers had volunteered their services during the height of the outbreak in 
October. Seventy-five teachers had become ill and at least four teachers and one school 
nurse had died. 27 
26Ibid., 12, 13, 15 October 1918. 
27Ibid., 15, 16, 20 October 1918; "Report of Acting Superintendent A.H. Hill to 
the Richmond School Board," Minutes of the Richmond School Board, 31October1918, 
minute book entitled "November 1916-February 1919," 354; School Reports 1918-
1919, Richmond School Board office, Richmond, Virginia, 21-22. 
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An investigation of the hospital by Drs. R. W. Garnett and Beverly R. Tucker 
concluded that conditions at John Marshall were satisfactory and patients were receiving 
appropriate medical care. Rooms on each floor had been transformed into sanitary wards 
filled with rows of clean, white beds, separated by screens. The transformation of the 
school into a modem hospital led one individual to comment that John Marshall was "the 
most interesting building in the city of Richmond .... Gone are the desks from the 
classrooms and the blackboards alone are mute reminders of lessons learned from books 
for the greatest lesson of all is being taught- the caring for suffering humanity."28 
Indeed, one observer judged that the public seemed to show a "morbid curiosity" in the 
hospital, as people gathered on the sidewalk and leaned on the fences surrounding the 
building watching "the lighted windows and figures of doctors, nurses, and attendants 
moving about within with the same intentness that they would accord a thrilling screen 
drama."29 
The hospital was divided into pneumonia, influenza, and children's wards. The 
medical team consisted of both general practitioners and specialists who made rounds in 
the various wards twice a day. Surgeons admitted the sick, answered emergency calls, 
and treated patients in the absence of attending physicians. A team of six doctors worked 
from 5:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M., and three physicians staffed the hospital at night.30 
28Richmond Times-Dispatch, 13 October 1918. 
29Ibid., 14 October 1918. 
30Ibid., 19 October 1918. 
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While the very young escaped the worst of the epidemic, a number of babies and 
children were admitted to the John Marshall Emergency Hospital. These cases, however, 
were less serious, and there were few deaths among these patients. On one occasion, a 
healthy baby was born to a mother in the influenza ward. When children were released 
from John Marshall, many returned home only to discover that other family members had 
contracted influenza. In several cases, children had been orphaned or lost a parent while 
hospitalized. A father asked hospital officials to delay the discharge of his two children 
by one day because he had just buried their mother and was preparing to bury their infant 
sibling. Another discharged boy returned home to find that his mother had died and four 
family members were ill. To care for these cases, hospital officials formed a committee 
to investigate the home conditions of children who were ready to be discharged. A 
Catholic priest also established a home for black children who were orphaned or unable 
to return to their homes.31 
Richmond authorities reported that influenza had taken longer to infiltrate the 
city's black population. Flannagan hoped that the medical community could control the 
epidemic among blacks by preparing for an increase in cases among this group and 
promoting preventative measures. Black influenza patients initially were treated in the 
basement of the John Marshall Hospital. As this ward reached capacity, city health 
officials opened an emergency hospital at the Baker Colored Public School on October 
15. Dr. Miller of the John Marshall Emergency Hospital and state and city officials 
31Ibid., 14, 16, 20, 21 October 1918. 
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supervised the operation of this Jackson Ward facility. Black patients at John Marshall, 
who were not seriously ill, were transferred to the Baker School shortly after it opened. 
The Baker Emergency Hospital was staffed entirely by African-Americans, including its 
head physician, a Dr. Hughes. A young woman, Dr. Bessie Tharp, who had studied at 
Harvard Medical School and the University of Boston, assisted Dr. Hughes. By October 
24, over one hundred patients were being treated at the Baker School.32 
After inspecting the hospital, Governor Davis remarked, "It is an excellent thing 
to have our colored people so well able to work out their own problems independent of 
white help and without any mixing of activity. It shows that they are progressing and that 
they will become helpful workers in the future of the state."33 A reporter also praised the 
leaders at the Baker School for their excellent organization and management, noting that 
people born and raised in Richmond, not "northern importations," made up the majority 
of the staff. A member of the medical team appreciated the chance to demonstrate the 
capabilities of black physicians: 
We have had no opportunity before to do for our own people what we have been 
able to do here. It is a service from which we will reap benefits for years to come, 
for our own people here in the South have never had the confidence in us in the 
past that they will have in the future since with funds and equipment furnished us 
we have been able to show them what we are able to accomplish.34 
32Ibid., 13, 15-17, 23, 25 October 1918. 
33Ibid., 20 October 1918. 
34Ibid., 25 October 1918. 
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Dr. Flannagan also opened the Richmond Board of Health to treat emergency 
cases; however, the influenza epidemic soon depleted his staff of nurses. Flannagan 
repeated his plea for women to volunteer at his office and the emergency hospital. The 
demand for trained nurses was so great that it was considered unpatriotic for these 
women to continue treating their private patients.35 The Board of Health also asked 
women to assist with chores that visiting nurses lacked the time to do. A woman on 
Flannagan's staff emphasized that these volunteers were expected to do unpleasant work: 
The exigencies of this terrible situation in the city demand unusual things of the 
women of the city. We must face the fact that to carry flowers or a pitcher of 
soup is well enough, but there is other work to be done in these stricken homes 
which in normal times would be servants' work- clean linen must be put on 
beds, slops must be emptied, soiled garments changed, and dirty hands and faces 
washed.36 
As the epidemic eased in Richmond, there was less demand for nurses and 
volunteers. Assistant Director Agnes Randolph reported that graduate nurses were 
available to teach volunteer nurses about the proper care of influenza and pneumonia 
patients.37 Dr. Flannagan's wife, who had volunteered at John Marshall, asked workers 
to remain committed to their jobs: "the real test in the influenza situation, so far as this 
hospital is concerned, is now upon us. The excitement is over. Work from now on is 
35Ibid., 14, 15 October 1918. 
36Ibid., 16 October 1918. 
37Ibid. 
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bound to be more or less of a grind, and it remains to be seen how many of us will stick 
to our posts and see it through."38 
Despite the apparent crest of the epidemic, patients continued to arrive at John 
Marshall and officials renewed their calls for volunteers. Some volunteers at John 
Marshall and the Baker School had to return home to care for influenza patients in their 
families, while others could not continue with the demanding hospital schedule. The 
principal of John Marshall High School appeared before the Richmond School Board to 
ask for more reliable janitorial service at the emergency hospital. Because the Richmond 
Health Department now controlled the school, the School Board decided that it had no 
authority to require janitors from Richmond schools to work at the emergency hospital. 
However, after only one elderly man answered the call for help, public school janitors 
agreed to return to work even though the Richmond School Board opposed their 
decision.39 In a public appeal for orderlies and nurses' aides, Dr. Miller noted how 
difficult the work had become: 
The trouble is that the novelty of the hospital is wearing off and we are getting 
down to the grind. The nervous strain is beginning to tell on all of us. This is the 
first time I have relaxed today. We have to admit that it is not only a nervous 
strain to work in the hospital, but to come into the building at all with the natural 
fear that every one has of contracting the disease, but we cannot afford to let go at 
this stage of the game. 40 
38Ibid., 20 October 1918. 
39Ibid., 22, 23 October 1918; Minutes of the Richmond School Board, 21 October 
1918, minute book entitled ''November 1916-February 1919," Richmond School Board 
office, Richmond, Virginia, 34 7. 
40Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23 October 1918. 
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Richmond families called the Health Department and the Instructing Visiting 
Nurses' Association (IVNA) for aid in their homes. Nurses from the IVNA merged with 
the Richmond Health Department and worked in assigned districts in order to locate 
those who needed assistance. These nurses, along with volunteers, reported their findings 
to the Richmond Health Department. Mrs. J. W. Faris, the chief nurse of the Health 
Department, issued a general appeal to the public for available nurses. She called on 
married graduate nurses to volunteer on either a full or a part-time basis. Faris also asked 
undergraduates, nurses' aids, and white or black women with nursing experience to 
register with her.41 
Even when the epidemic crested, Mrs. Faris continued to request the service of 
visiting nurses, hoping that women would not quit as the cases began declining. As the 
situation improved throughout the state, nurses were needed even more than doctors. At 
the emergency hospitals, they trained and supervised volunteers, as well as cared for 
patients. Health officials appealed to the patriotism of women and urged them to work in 
h h . l · · . 42 t e emergency osp1ta s or serve as v1s1tmg nurses. 
Before they visited homes, Flannagan gave the nurses instructions regarding 
equipment and care of the sick. Each nurse was expected to dress simply and carry a 
handbag containing supplies such as a large apron, nail brush, soap, gauze masks, castor 
oil, two-grain quinine pills, and alkaline antiseptic tablets for mouth wash. When visiting 
41Ibid., 6 October 1918. 
42Ibid., 26 October 1918. 
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a family, nurses first were to ask if a doctor was treating the sick. If so, the nurse was to 
follow his orders. If there was no doctor in attendance, the nurse was instructed to use 
her own judgment. She was told to wear a mask when treating the patient and to urge 
family members to do the same. Nurses were to ventilate the patient's room and 
emphasize the need for extended bed rest in order for the sick to regain their strength and 
prevent pneumonia. After leaving the patient's room, they were told to wash their hands 
and clean their masks in the antiseptic solution. Nurses also left leaflets on home 
prevention of influenza.43 
The American Red Cross joined the Public Health Service and the state 
governments to fight the influenza epidemic. These organizations mobilized medical and 
nursing units to travel to areas of the country in need of aid. Throughout the nation, the 
Red Cross enrolled nurses, opened emergency hospitals, donated supplies, and sent 
volunteers to help manage household duties in homes where adults were ill. The Red 
Cross asked each chapter to form a committee that would work with its local health 
department. The local chapters were instructed to organize women with nursing 
experience and those without training who were willing to volunteer. Women with little 
experience were placed under the supervision of physicians or highly trained nurses. 
Because nurses were needed in Europe as well as in the United States, Red Cross 
43Ibid., 6 October 1918. 
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chapters complied with a request from the Surgeon General of the Army to survey the 
number of women with nursing experience.44 
The Roanoke Red Cross chapter, headed by Mrs. S. W. Jamison, teamed with the 
local Board of Health to combat influenza. Mrs. Lydia LaBaume was chosen as the 
chapter liaison to the Health Department. LaBaume organized free nursing classes at the 
Roanoke Hospital to help train volunteers. Over twenty public school teachers enrolled 
as Red Cross volunteers. Black teachers were called upon to volunteer in the homes of 
black influenza victims. Red Cross volunteers were paid for their service, but warned 
that the work would be difficult.45 
Roanoke officials called for more women to assist with nursing duties. The 
Roanoke Times urged women to accept this call to duty: 
We know of no better way in which women may serve their community and their 
country at this time than by heeding this call. To alleviate the sufferings of 
stricken humanity has ever been true womanhood's noblest accomplishment and 
we have faith that the women of Roanoke will not fail to recognize the 
opportunity for service that this call presents ... The young woman of Roanoke 
must face the fact that this is no time to be playing bridge or attending teas. 
There's work- real work, needful work-· to be done for God and His people. 
To do nothing at all in the common cause is to be the worst kind of slacker.46 
44New York Times, 27September1918; Roanoke Times, 8, 24 October 1918. 
45Roanoke Times, 6, 8, 18 October 1918. 
46Ibid., 22 October 1918. 
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The Newport News Daily Press issued their own "call to womanhood," and asked all 
women with nursing experience to respond to the Red Cross survey of the nation's 
nursing force. 47 
Although the Red Cross paid nurses for their work, private doctors sometimes 
offered nurses higher wages to care for their wealthy patients. Those who were not 
seriously ill were called upon to release their nurses so that they could treat emergency 
cases. The Lynchburg Advance decried those who monopolized nurses: 
Scores of trained nurses are now paid a high price to care for semi-invalids, who 
suffer from selfish imagination more than from illness, and for normally healthy 
children who would be better for a little real material care .... No civilian has the 
right to monopolize the life-saving power of a nurse in time of national need, and 
no nurse of high patriotic and professional principles will permit selfish interest to 
stand in the way of essential service to the Nation.48 
The Richmond chapter of the Red Cross, headed by H.G. Boykin, suspended all 
activity unrelated to influenza and concentrated its efforts on combating the epidemic. 
Red Cross members unpacked boxes that were to be shipped to France, and instead sent 
the supplies to the John Marshall Hospital. The organization donated hundreds of sheets, 
pillowcases, pajamas, bathrobes, slippers, and handkerchiefs to the emergency hospital. 
The Red Cross furnished nurses with medicine bags and supplies and arranged for the 
installation of hospital beds donated by the Army-Navy club.49 
47Newport News Daily Press, 27 October 1918. 
48Roanoke Times, 24 October 1918. 
49RichmondTimes-Dispatch, 9October1918. 
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The Richmond Catholic Women's Auxiliary to the Red Cross made nightgowns 
for children at the John Marshall Emergency Hospital. The Richmond chapter of the Red 
Cross requested the assistance of all women who could sew in order to meet the growing 
demand for hospital supplies and garments. The Roanoke Red Cross also supplied clean 
clothes and gowns for children. The Newport News chapter contributed volunteers as 
well as supplies to the Walter Reed Emergency Hospital. Red Cross chapters throughout 
the state also produced facemasks for the public. 50 
The Red Cross assisted at Camp Lee, where it aided the visiting relatives of ill 
soldiers. In one case a soldier died a few hours before his mother and sister arrived from 
Minnesota. The Red Cross paid for their return home, as well as the departure of a Texas 
woman who contracted influenza while visiting her ill husband at Camp Lee. At the Red 
Cross convalescent house, relatives of influenza patients at the base hospital were given 
free board and transportation to Camp Lee.51 
During the epidemic, various organizations opened soup kitchens to feed the sick. 
The Richmond IVNA established soup kitchens throughout the city. On October 8, the 
first soup kitchen opened at St. James Church, and the Health Department recommended 
that other churches open their own kitchens. Members of the congregations were asked 
to donate milk, soup, meat, and glass bottles. Richmond's chief dietitian, Helen 
Gallegher, requested that individuals wishing to help should contribute ingredients rather 
50Ibid., 13 October 1918; Roanoke Times, 19 October 1918; Newport News Daily 
Press, 13 October 1918. 
51Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9 October 1918. 
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than donate homemade soup to city hospitals. Nurses in need of broth for their patients 
could acquire it from the numerous kitchens that began appearing throughout Richmond. 
The United States government also began making soup at a city plant, eventually 
preparing one hundred gallons a day for Richmond patients. A distribution headquarters 
for bread soon was established at St. Peter's Church on Eighth and Grace Street, and the 
Catholic Women's Auxiliary began dispensing as many as 2,000 rolls per day to the 
city's ill. 52 
Soup kitchens were opened in communities throughout the state. In Pulaski, 
Reverand Thomas Opie, Mayor E. W. Calfee, and several other community members 
opened a soup kitchen in the town Fraternity building. Chicken and beef broth, coffee, 
and toast were prepared by volunteers and taken to homes where families were unable to 
cook. Volunteers in Roanoke prepared special food for the sick at the Y.W.C.A. diet 
kitchen. The Hampton Red Cross chapter opened a soup kitchen in a local church to 
provide soup and tea to influenza patients and their family members. 53 
Doctors often prescribed a liquid diet of milk, but due to shortages, patients in 
Newport News and Richmond had a difficult time obtaining it. The government had 
purchased most of the milk supply in Newport News for use in the military camps. To 
ensure the proper delivery of milk in Richmond, Dr. Flannagan instructed the Chief Dairy 
Inspector to give preference to infants and the sick. Many workers at Richmond's dairy 
52Ibid., 9-11, 13-15 October 1918. 
53 Roanoke Times, 11, 22 October 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 19 October 
1918. 
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distributing plants had become ill, and the shortage of manpower affected the delivery of 
milk to city residents. Production also fell at local dairy farms due to the illness of 
workers. As the milk shortage became more acute, Flannagan requisitioned prisoners 
from the city jail to work in the dairies. He pledged that the city would take control of 
the plants if this solution failed. s4 
The delivery of food was vital to families overwhelmed by influen7.a. Members 
of the IVNA reported that many children had to accept soup because the adults in the 
home were sick. Some victims of influen7.a were too ill to call for medical assistance. At 
one residence, ambulance drivers observed a sign reading "Walk in, don't knock," and 
discovered a woman who needed to be carried to the hospital. Single women who lived 
alone and had few acquaintances in the city were especially at risk since their illness 
could go undetected by others.ss 
Louise Lewis, a social worker with the IVNA, and three assistants investigated 
home conditions in almost 1,400 cases. The social workers encountered households 
where the majority of family members were bedridden. At one Cary Street home, a 
father had succumbed to influenza, and his wife and their seven children remained ill. At 
another home, ten of thirteen members were confined to their beds. Visiting nurses also 
discovered a single mother who had been ill for eight days and was unable to contact a 
54Ibid., 3 October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 11, 13, 16 October 1918. 
sslbid., 11, 15 October 1918. 
80 
doctor. She died the next day, leaving eight children under the age of ten to be cared for 
by nurses until relatives could be contacted. 56 
Throughout the epidemic, volunteers were called upon to help the sick. The 
Richmond Times-Dispatch commended these individuals for their service: 
Never before, at least not since the Civil War, has there been such a magnificent 
demonstration of public spirit in the readiness and willingness to make sacrifices 
for humanity sake. Day and night these volunteers arc working tirelessly, ever at 
the bedside of those who are ill, administering to those whom death has robbed. or 
performing other tasks and errands of mercy and helpfulness.57 
Individuals noted for their sacrifice included an eighty-year-old Roanoke woman 
who volunteered for nursing duty, but was turned down by the Red Cross because 
officials did not want to expose her to influenza. Another citizen singled out for 
recognition was a Richmond telephone electrician who refused to return home to North 
Carolina after learning his sister had died and his brother-in-law was ill: "I couldn't do 
anything ifl went down there, and I can do something for people who arc sick here in the 
city, so I have just stayed on the job." After the influenza epidemic had passed, the State 
Board of Health praised the commitment of volunteers stating that "community spirit had 
been awakened in Virginia as at no time since the Civil \Var."58 
56Ibid., 21October1918. 
57Ibid., 15 October 1918. 
58 Roanoke Times, 25 December 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch. 15 October 
1918; Annual Report of the State Board of Health, 80. 
CHAPTERS 
DAILY LIFE DURING THE EPIDEMIC 
The daily lives of Americans changed dramatically during the fall of 1918. 
Churches, schools, and gathering places were closed, and normal routines of life were 
disrupted. Many Americans turned to their faith to cope during this period of illness and 
death. The Presbyterian National Headquarters called on its 10,000 churches to use 
November 6 as a day of prayer for the abatement of Spanish influenza. Popular 
evangelist Billy Sunday instructed his followers to use prayer to suppress the flu. 1 
The closing of houses of worship was a controversial issue in Virginia. When 
churches first closed in Richmond, several congregations quickly announced outdoor 
Sunday services as a substitute for indoor worship.2 Richmonder George H. Wiley 
believed that some form of worship needed to continue during the epidemic: 
It is a very different matter to meet in promiscuous crowds of hundreds to hear 
men comment on Sunday school lessons or preach from a text of scripture, from 
gathering in small groups to cry unto God for city and State and nation in this 
time of great calamity from war and disease. If ever Richmond has had more 
reason, since the Civil War, to gather for the sole purpose of prayer, I do not 
recall that day.3 
The Richmond Planet, the city's black newspaper, also questioned the closing of 
churches during a time of great hardship: "Faith is not in evidence in this country today. 
1New York Times, 31October1918; Roehling, The Great Epidemic, 118-119. 
2Richmond Times-Dispatch, 6 October 1918. 
3Ibid., 12 October 1918. 
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God has the power to heal the sick, restore sight to the blind, but He is not believed to be 
able to cure people of Spanish influenza, nor to prevent the people from contracting it 
when they go up to His temple for spiritual consolation in the time of trouble. Oh the 
pity of it. ... It is the lack of faith in God that is the cause of much of our troubles. ,,.i 
Ministers in Elizabeth City County recommended that the local Board of Health 
ban all funerals in churches or homes, and allow only graveside services. Richmond 
health authorities also prohibited funerals held in churches. Dr. Roy Flannagan, head of 
the Richmond Health Department, recommended that all funerals take place at the grave, 
rather than in private homes, to reduce the likelihood of influenza transmission. One 
thirty-two-year-old woman reportedly contracted influenza at the funeral of her mother. 
State Health Commissioner Ennion Williams received numerous requests for mortuary 
transportation permits. Undertakers in Richmond had a difficult time locating coffins for 
those who had succumbed to Spanish influenza. In one day alone, twenty-one burials 
took place in the city's Oakwood Cemetery. In Roanoke up to thirteen funerals had been 
held on a single day. 5 
Other cities in the United States experienced severe coffin shortages. In 
Baltimore, coffins were at a premium, and undertakers had difficulty keeping pace with 
the bodies that awaited burial. The lack of gravediggers forced the city to use its laborers 
to dig burial plots. Similar conditions existed in Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. 
4Richmond Planet, 19 October 1918. 
5Newport News Daily Press, 9 October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 6, 7, 15, 
21 October 1918, Roanoke Times, 20 October 1918. 
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During the second and third weeks of October, death rates in Philadelphia soared. Due to 
the shortage of coffins, morticians, embalmers, and gravediggers, bodies quickly 
accumulated and sometimes remained in homes for days before they were buried. The 
city morgue, which could normally handle up to thirty-six bodies, soon was 
overburdened, and five temporary morgues were established in Philadelphia. 6 
Influenza disrupted telephone service throughout Virginia and the United States. 
In Philadelphia 850 telephone employees were absent on October 7, forcing the Bell 
Telephone Company to request that customers confine calls to emergencies. In New 
York City, 2,000 telephone operators were ill, and the New York Times asked its readers 
to limit their calls during the crisis.7 Service in cities including Washington, D.C., 
Newport News, and Roanoke was interrupted. Some operators at the Chesapeake and 
Potomac Telephone Company in Richmond also developed influenza. Their absence, 
combined with a dramatic upswing in calls, forced the phone company to limit long-
distance calls to government business and emergencies. In desperate need of manpower, 
the phone company asked former employees at the central office to return to work for a 
few hours each day. The volume of calls became so high that the company sent out an 
urgent plea for volunteers to help call each of the 13,000 telephone customers in 
6New York Times, 19 October 1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 76-77, 82-83. 
7Ibid., 75, 97; New York Times, 17, 22October1918. 
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Richmond. Many young women answered the request for help and began contacting city 
residents to ask that they limit their use of the phone to emergencies.8 
Automobiles also were in high demand across the nation. Residents of 
Washington, D.C. donated vehicles to the Motor Ambulance Corp that was established 
during the epidemic. Two automobiles had been donated to the Roanoke Red Cross to 
transport Boy Scouts delivering food to the sick. Automobile owners in Newport News 
were asked to donate their vehicles so that patients and supplies could be transported to 
the Walter Reed Emergency Hospital. The Woman's Club of Richmond asked its 
members to lend their cars to the churches delivering soup to the sick. Women were 
asked to drive Boy Scouts as they conducted their surveys of Richmond doctors. 
Automobiles loaned to the John Marshall Hospital were registered so that it would be 
known when specific cars would be available during the day. City officials also 
permitted the emergency use of automobiles on Sundays. Drivers assisting influenza 
patients were asked to display a poster furnished by city administrators in their car. With 
the exception of these emergency cars, ambulances, and hearses, Richmond streets were 
empty during the epidemic.9 
The influenza epidemic also hurt trade. Richmond retailers reported that their 
business had slowed considerably, but expected shoppers to return once the epidemic 
8Richmond Times-Dispatch, 11, 12 October 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 11 
October 1918; Roanoke Times, 15 October 1918. 
9Hoehling, The Great Epidemic, 55; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12-14 October 
1918; Roanoke Times, 22 October 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 11October1918. 
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ended. Though stores remained open, salespeople often took nbsences because of illness. 
\Vholesalers urged their traveling salesmen to stop working. Rural merchants who 
usually bought goods in Richmond delnyed their trips lo the city while influcn7..n wns nt 
its peak. The cancellation of the state fair also affected retailers who depended on trade 
from out-of-t0\\11 visitors. The only businesses that did not suffer during the epidemic 
were drug stores nnd groceries. 10 
Stores in Pulaski closed at noon each day due to the severity of the epidemic. ·n1e 
closing orders also decreased trade in Roanoke. Accounts of the sick refusing to leave 
work concerned Roanoke health officials. The Health Department asked managers to 
insist that nny employee who showed S}mptoms of influen1.a immedintely return home. 
As in Richmond, visitors delayed trips to Roanoke until nfier the closing ordinance was 
lifted. Hotels nnd passenger trains reported a reduction in business during the epidemic. 
Indeed, influenza crippled commerce throughout the nation. Robert Fife informed his 
family in Charlottesville about the situation in Connecticut: "We nrc nt the height of the 
epidemic nnd it certainly has stopped the wheels of trade nnd industry. Some factories 
have closed, the others arc barely able to make the wheels go round. " 11 
The nbsencc of workers left many manufacturers unable to fill their orders. The 
reduced manpower in freight offices and on trains made it difficult to transport goods. 
10Riclrmond Times-Dispatclr. 14 October 1918. 
11 Ibid .. 16October1918; Roanoke Times, 9, 11, 19, 31October1918; Robert 
Herndon Fife II to Sarah Ann Graves Strickler Fife. 12 October 1918. Box I. 
Freudenberg correspondence. 
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Norfolk and Western foremen were required to report influenza cases after a large 
number of workers reported sick. The Virginian Railway suffered high absenteeism due 
to the illness of employees or their families. In Newport News, influenza struck the 
workforce at the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad and construction at the city's shipyard was 
reduced by a third. A steamboat line, which traveled between Richmond and Petersburg, 
also suspended operation because of a lack of workers. An order by the State Council of 
Defense led to the closing of all tobacco warehouses throughout Virginia. Auctions at 
the warehouses drew large crowds which officials feared would contribute to the spread 
of influenza. 12 
Influenza struck many of the workers who staffed offices and businesses 
throughout Richmond. Forty post office clerks were ill, while at the police department at 
least three detectives, a sergeant, and an automobile policeman had the flu. The absence 
of employees at the Richmond Gas Works forced the Administrative Board to threaten to 
fire those who missed work without a valid excuse. Influenza also impacted the Virginia 
Railway and Power Company, which operated Richmond's streetcars. Streetcar service 
was running below normal levels due to the illness of sixty conductors and motormen. 
During the second epidemic in Richmond, twenty-five streetcars were idled after fifty 
employees became ill. 13 
12Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14, I 5 October 1918; Roanoke Times, 17 October, 
30November1918; Neuport News Daily Press, 8, 13October1918. 
13 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4, 8, 14 October, 10 December 1918. 
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The Board of Health requested that city streetcars operate according to an "open 
house" plan. The windows of all cars were to remain open, and passengers were advised 
to dress warmly when traveling. The congestion on streetcars during the morning rush 
hour concerned city health officials. When schools reopened, they feared the crowds of 
men, women, and children on the cars would contribute to the spread of influenza. To 
prevent this, Richmond officials planned to open schools at 10:00 A.M. and stagger the 
peak loading times throughout the morning. One patron urged the Virginia Railway and 
Power Company to provide more streetcars during the epidemic.14 
Some passengers refused to keep the windows of the streetcars open. One 
individual assaulted a conductor who refused to close the windows on his car. A 
concerned citizen wrote to the Richmond Times-Dispatch claiming that air circulating in 
open streetcars facilitated the transmission of influenza. 15 Another patron took a different 
view. During the second outbreak, this individual criticized the relaxed attitudes his 
fellow passengers seemed to display: "Get on any car and you will find them almost 
hermetically sealed against the fresh air. People were coughing and sneezing and few 
took the trouble to use their handkerchiefs or hands to protect their fellow passengers 
from being sprayed by germs."16 
14Ibid., 6, 9, 16 October 1918. 
15Ibid., 9 October, 10 December 1918. 
16Ibid., 10 December 1918. 
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Roanoke health officials also ordered the Roanoke Railway and Electric Company 
to keep windows open in all city streetcars. With the closing of schools and public 
places, traffic on the city streetcars was lighter than normal. In Washington, D.C., the 
work hours of government employees were staggered to prevent crowding on city 
streetcars. As in Richmond, a number of streetcar operators missed work due to illness. 
Newport News officials also opened windows in streetcars to halt the spread of influenza. 
Passengers were asked to voluntarily keep the windows open and to exercise caution 
when sitting beside someone with cold symptoms. After passengers failed to abide by 
this request, the Health Department threatened to mandate an open window policy. 17 
After influenza depleted the Richmond street cleaning force by fifty percent, the 
sanitation of city streets became another matter of debate. Richmond Sheriff J. Herbert 
Mercer called on every able-bodied resident to help sweep the streets, alleys, and 
backyards in the city. One resident described the condition of the streets as appalling and 
faulted health officials for not cleaning the streets at the beginning of the epidemic. 18 
Another Richmonder called for a thorough cleansing of the streets: "the contagion that is 
suppose to spring upon us unaware lurks in the dust of our dirty city. A royal flush is 
what the streets need."19 
11Roanoke Times, 8, 15 October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch. 10 December 
1918; Newport News Daily Press, 1, 2, 18 October 1918. 
18 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 16, 19 October 1918. 
19Ibid., 14 October 1918. 
The social life of Virginians also c.lnle to 3 lull during the height of the epidemic. 
In Newport News the man.1ger of the AcMcm)· of Music n:ported tfut the closing 
restrictions forced him to cancel nightly tra\'cling shows. lndc:cJ. tra,·cling shows \\'Cf\: 
stranded throughout the nation after the new closing ordinances pmhihited their 
performances.!<> Brent Win. the Times-Di.rp(//ch society columnist, noted 1he .. h.in on 
entertaining of nil kinds. There :ire no dances :u the clubs, no function..' of nny si1c gi\'en. 
and most of the: weddings :ire cclc:brn1ed \'cry quietly with church ceremonic-s nh.mdoned 
at the Inst moment."11 Nellie Scon Pa)nc of Richmond withdrew the invit:ition..' 10 her 
wedding and held the: ceremony in her aunt's np.1rtmenl.:: fa·c:n sm.111 i:.1thcrings wen: 
discouraged, n.s Win remarked ''there is no gossip o\·er the leacups. for one hoilatcs to 
invite even n round of one's friends in to male n g:ithering of any sort ... ~ 1 
When the ban in Richmond was lilted. the mooJ of the: city'$ soci:ili1cs 
brightened. As theaters rropcnc:J. and conccru and mccting..' once ng11in look place. Win 
obscr\'cd tfut "nil signs point to 3 more joyou., ntmosphm: dun tus hccn fell hen: since 
the: first efTc:cts of the epidemic were noted .... ooded to the encouraging and in..~piring 
news from across the seas. one finds the outlook for the social sa.son not lulf so 
~Seu port .\°etu f)m(•· Pre.u, I 2 October 1918: lfcloChling. nre Cire,11 f.i1idenric. 
55-56. 
11 Riclrnumd TtmeJ-Dupardi. 13 October 1918. 
!Jlbid .• 27 October I 918. 
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humdrum as had been at first expected."24 When Richmond movie theaters reopened, 
crowds flocked to see the latest films starring Mary Pickford, Douglas Fairbanks, Billy 
Burke, and Marguerite Clark.25 A Times-Dispatch reporter noted that Richmonders were 
enjoying their freedom: "Those people who have talked germ, heard germ, thought germ, 
and heard others thinking germ until they thought themselves a germ are now free to 
think of other things. With the removal of the restrictions fear of the 'flu' has abandoned 
the minds of persons, and all goes merry as a marriage bell once more."26 
Some colleges were forced to close during the epidemic. Influenza killed at least 
three students at Robert Graves's college. After thirty William & Mary students became 
ill in late September, officials quarantined the campus and forbad anyone from entering 
or leaving without a pass. Influenza spread through Hollins College where seventy-five 
cases and one death were reported by September 26. By early October, a member of the 
State Board of Health who had visited the college, informed parents that the situation was 
improving and it would be safer for their daughters to remain at school. Influenza also 
crippled the Fork Union Military Academy. When the school opened on September 17, 
four incoming students were ill. By September 26, approximately half of the 120 
students were sick and the school was placed under a strict quarantine. Influenza quickly 
24Ibid., 11November1918. 
25Ibid., 10 November 1918. 
26Ibid., 6 November 1918. 
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spread through the student body and the local community, claiming the lives of at least 
four cadets.27 
The epidemic affected the Medical College of Virginia in a different manner. 
Because students had left school to assist doctors in the fall of 1918, classes remained in 
session throughout the summer of 1919.28 The State Board of Health praised the third 
and fourth year students from the Medical College of Virginia and the University of 
Virginia for their dedication and sacrifice: "these students ... have ventured into stricken 
communities where every hardship confronted them, and where their powers of 
endurance were taxed to the uttermost. ... In many instances, they jumped into the 
breach when no other doctors were available and forthwith assumed burdens little short 
of staggering. "29 
The influenza epidemic also threatened the success of the Fourth Liberty Loan 
drive. In the fall of 1918, Americans embarked on a campaign to raise six billion dollars 
in bonds for the war effort. In cities throughout the United States, Liberty Loan parades 
and rallies were held. On September 28, 200,000 Philadelphians gathered to view a 
Liberty Loan parade. That same day, 10,000 San Franciscans participated in their own 
parade. Buffalo officials permitted a Liberty Loan parade led by John Philip Sousa's 
27Robert Herndon Fife to Sarah Ann Fife, 12 October 1918, Box 1, Freudenberg 
correspondence; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 September, 14 October 1918; Newport 
News Daily Press, 27, 28 September 1918; Roanoke Times, 6 October 1918. 
28Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23 October 1918. 
29Ibid., 29 October 1918. 
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band. While influenza would have spread without these parades, these large assemblies 
probably encouraged the transmission of the disease.30 
John R. Mott, the Director General of the United War Work Campaign, 
encouraged local organizations to devote extra energy to the loan campaign during the 
epidemic. With people spending greater time at home, Mott theorized that the public 
might be more accepting of personal solicitations. He urged workers to emphasize 
printed material and hold informal gatherings since large meetings were prohibited. 
Liberty Loan workers were instructed to target the businesses and individuals who would 
be the most generous subscribers.31 
When the epidemic emerged in Richmond, a number of Liberty Loan workers 
became ill, and officials canceled meetings throughout the local district. Furthermore, 
the depleted staffs of local banks had difficulty managing the subscriptions and compiling 
reports for the central committees. The Federal Reserve Bank in New York City also 
reported a large number of absences at a time when work related to the Liberty Loan was 
at its height.32 
Prohibited from addressing audiences at the closed theaters, Liberty Loan 
speakers now planned to meet with workers in the city's manufacturing plants. Loan 
3
°Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 52-53, 72, 93; Roehling, The Great Epidemic, 
97-98. 
31John R. Mott, "Influenza and the United War Work Campaign," Bulletin XIII, 
United War Work Campaign for $175,000,000 (New York: Office of the Director 
General, November 1918). 
32Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8 October 1918; New York Times, 18 October 1918. 
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officials urged Richmond residents to go to their local banks and place their subscriptions 
themselves: "it is the duty of every Richmonder to go to his bank and purchase his bonds, 
just as the soldiers in France are not waiting to perform their duty, but are going out and 
searching for an opportunity to do some act which will contribute to the defeat of 
Germany."33 After the cancellation of a Richmond Liberty Day program, the Women's 
Munition Reserve used advertising to reach their subscription goal. An ad placed in the 
Times-Dispatch linked the bond drive with the epidemic: "Influenza is rampant at home. 
Huns are on the Rampage in Europe. Medical skill will stop the epidemic. Liberty bonds 
will stop the barbarous Germans."34 
Newport News officials canceled a large Liberty Loan rally scheduled for October 
6 and a "monster military and civic parade" to be held in celebration of Liberty Day on 
October 12. W. B. Vest, the director of the Liberty Loan campaign in Warwick County 
and Newport News, called on the public to subscribe at booths located in stores and 
banks. Vest requested that the public observe Liberty Day by buying bonds and asking 
neighbors if they had done likewise. During the epidemic, between sixty and eighty loan 
workers continued the door-to-door canvassing of the city. Boy Scouts also embarked on 
a campaign to sell bonds from October 11to19.35 
33 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8 October 1918. 
34Ibid., 11 October 1918. 
35Newport News Daily Press, 5, 8, 11, 12 October 1918. 
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With the Liberty Loan drive falling below expectations, President Woodrow 
Wilson appealed to the American people to buy bonds at this critical time. On October 
12, Wilson led 25,000 marchers in a New York City Liberty Loan parade. According to 
police estimates, over a million spectators lined the parade route. Despite these obstacles, 
the Fourth Liberty Loan drive was a success and the nation reached its quota.36 
The effect influenza had on individuals as well as the larger community is evident 
in the correspondence among members of the Fife family of Charlottesville. In a letter to 
her husband James Douglas Fife, an army doctor stationed in France, Katherine Fife 
described the anxiety and uncertainty influenza brought to her community: "Before you 
know people are sick. You hear of more death and it just makes you so depressed and 
worried." James Fife's brother William wrote to their sister Ella Katherine Fife, a nurse 
stationed in St. Denis, France, that "Influenza and the sequel, pneumonia has claimed 
many victims here. You cannot imagine how it has scourged the country, schools closed, 
churches, theaters, and all public gatherings dissembled. None of these will open again 
here until November, though the epidemic is now abated." Margaret Fife also informed 
Ella about the closings and the loss of life in Charlottesville: "This grippe has been just 
like a plague of olden times, for about two weeks the Progress was mainly given up to 
recording the deaths of its citizens."37 
36Richmond Times-Dispatch, 11 October 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 13 
October, 20 November 1918; Roanoke Times, 2 November 1918. 
37Katherine Mae Reynolds Fife to James Douglas Fife, 13 October 1918; William 
Ormond Fife to Ella Katherine Fife, 26 October 1918; Margaret Whitler Fife to Ella 
Katherine Fife, 7 November 1918, Box 1, Freudenberg correspondence. 
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Several members of the Fife family, including William and his wife, developed 
influenza, as did some close friends. Crump Tucker, the fiancee of Margaret, lost eight 
friends to the disease. Within the Fife family the most serious case involved Shelton 
Strickler Fife's spouse, Mildred. Mildred Fife was pregnant when she contracted 
influenza and pneumonia. Doctors confined her to her bed, and the family hired nurses to 
treat her during the day and at night. Although Mildred's condition was grave, her family 
did not want to alarm Ella, who remained in France. When Mildred's health improved, 
Margaret revealed just how ill their sister-in-law had been: 
Mama went to see Mildred today for the first time. I haven't been in her room 
yet, she is so nervous about seeing people, but has invited me to come next time I 
go up there .... Mama says she is very thin but talks a lot and her voice is strong 
.... and she is gradually getting her strength back. Dr. Daniel is anxious for her 
to try to walk about some. Thinks she needs to have some exercise now. She was 
surely one ill woman. When I wrote to you last, she was just developing 
pneumonia, but I couldn't tell you because I knew it might be so long before you 
got another letter from home. Her recovery is regarded as one of the seven 
wonders of the town.38 
In December, Sarah Fife reported that Mildred still remained weak, but was able to leave 
her home.39 
Ella Fife confessed to her mother how difficult it was to hear about the epidemic 
when she was so far from home: "As it is, I will worry now for fear something is 
wrong- Suspense is dreadful." Ella found it difficult to digest the news of sickness and 
38Sarah Ann Graves Strickler Fife to Ella Katherine Fife, 29 October 1918; 
Margaret Whitler Fife to Ella Katherine Fife, 7 November 1918, Box 1, ibid. 
39Sarah Ann Graves Strickler Fife to Ella Katherine Fife, 4 December 1918, Box 
1, ibid. 
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death at home: "If I were to stop and think of the tragedies that have passed since I left 
home to go to camp, I would be overwhelmed.''"'0 
Ella had treated influenza patients in France, and some of her colleagues became 
ill: "There has been a great quantity of it here. Most of the nurses and doctors are better 
now, though some have been quite sick. We lost our lieutenant and two enlisted men .... 
[we] have really had very few deaths considering the number of sick patients we've had.'' 
She also remarked that the cases she encountered seemed milder than those described in 
the United States: "The 'flu' has absolutely played havoc at home- it seems so much 
more virulent there than here." In December, Ella was diagnosed with a mild case of the 
flu and pleurisy. She left the damp climate of St. Denis to recuperate in milder Cannes:" 
The Menefee family of Luray, Virginia also \\Tote to their loved-one, Marvin 
Menefee, about the epidemic. Marvin, a second lieutenant in the U. S. Army, had been 
wounded in the Meuse-Argonne offensive on October J 5 and was recovering in a French 
hospital. His younger sister Mabel offered her brother a few words of advice: "Don't get 
the flu. So many people have got it and they don't last very long either. I never heard of 
so many people dying with it." She reported that school had been canceled for the past 
two weeks, and would probably be closed for at least a month.42 
"
0Ella Katherine Fife to Sarah Ann Graves Strickler Fife, 14 November 1918. Box 
1. ibid.; Ella Katherine Fife to Margaret Whitler Fife, 15 January J 9 J 9, Box 2, ibid. 
41 Ella Katherine Fife to Sarah Ann Graves Strickler Fife, 28 October. 14 
November 1918. Box 1. ibid.; Ella Katherine Fife to James Douglas Fife. 30 December 
1918; Ella Katherine Fife to Margaret Whitler Fife, 30 January 1919, Box 2, ibid. 
41Mable ?\.fenefcc to Marvin Menef cc. 17 October 1918, Menefee papers. 
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Marvin's mother, Minnie, informed her son that entire families in their 
community were dying from the flu and commented on the unprecedented nature of this 
illness: "There never was anything passed through the country like this." Though their 
family had been using "every preventative," Marvin's father, James, his mother, and his 
sisters Katherine and Isabel became ill. Mabel was the only member of the household 
spared by influenza. The Menefees eventually recovered, but Minnie mentioned 
acquaintances that died, including a mother and her twenty-year-old son. She remarked 
that all of the deaths had resulted from pneumonia.43 
43Minnie Menefee to Marvin Menefee, 17, 24 October 1918, ibid. 
CHAPTER6 
SPANISH INFLUENZA: CAUSES AND CURES 
During the epidemic the public speculated about the actual cause of Spanish 
influenza, and rumors about its origin spread throughout the nation. Some connected the 
disease with the war and believed that the Germans had unleashed influenza on their 
enemies. Health officials publicized the symptoms of the flu, and the public tried various 
remedies to treat the illness. The medical community was divided over the most effective 
way to prevent influenza. Doctors and health officials could do little to halt the advance 
of influenza in the fall of 1918. 
Syndicated columnist Dr. William Brady noted that rumors about the source of 
influenza were common during the epidemic of 1889. At that time, a popular superstition 
held that influenza had been brought to the United States on "wild winds" from Europe. 
Surgeon General Rupert Blue informed the public that despite the name of "Spanish 
influenza," the disease had not originated in Spain. Dr. Alfred Williams, a Richmond 
physician, reminded the public of the epidemic in Lawrence, Kansas that had occurred 
during March. He traced the spread of the illness to Europe and Asia before it reappeared 
in the United States in September.1 
Others connected influenza with the war, often blaming the spread of the disease 
on sinister forces. The New York Times reported that Spanish influenza may have arisen 
1 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 25 September 1918; Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 
49; Roanoke Times, 7 October, 29 November 1918. 
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in the unsanitary and overerowdt.-d Gcnnan trenches and camps. In a syndicated nniclc 
published in the Riclmwnd Times-Dispatclr, Dr. Gordon 1 lcnry I lirshberg mnintnined that 
the epidemic had originarcd in the trench<.."S of Gennnny, bur Ix-came kno\\11 as Spanish 
influenza after the French noted how serious the epidemic was in Spain. I lirshberg nlso 
mentioned rumors of Gennan U-boats spreading influen1.a in the United States: 
The physicians and scientists of the Allied counrries arc seriously considering 
whether or not the genns of rhis disease ha\'e been intentionally disseminated by 
the Gennan Go\'emment \\ith the intention of weakening their opponents. No 
definite conclusion has been reached on this point. but the charge cannot he 
hastily dismissed. as the Gennan Go\'emment has already lx.-cn convicted of 
employing disease genns against ci\'ilians in Rom:mia.2 
Theories concerning U-boats were widespread. TI1e Nt•w fork Ti11u•s speculated 
that influenza had originated in the poor living conditions aboard these submarines and 
was brought to Spain by the U-boat crcws.3 Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Doane, head of 
the Health and Sanitation St.-ction of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, believed that 
Gennans had used submarines to infiltrate and spread influcn1.a in the United States: "It 
would be quite easy for one of these Gennan agents to tum loose Spanish influen1.a 
genns in a theatre or some other place where large numbers of person.c; arc a.'>.scmbled. 
The Gennans have staned epidemics in Europe. and there is no rca.<;<m why they should 
be particularly gentle with Americ.1:_. United Stares agents investigated the widespread 
2
,\'ew fork Time:r. 22 September 1918; Riclrnrond Tinre.'i-Di.tpatch. 6 October 
1918. 
3
.\'ew fork Times. 31 ~fay 1918. 
'Ibid .• 19 September 1918. 
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rumors concerning the German submarines, but concluded that servicemen and travelers 
had spread Spanish influenza. 5 
According to another theory, American soldiers had been infected with influenza 
through aspirin tablets manufactured by the German Bayer company. Dr. W. Brownley 
Foster, Roanoke's Health Officer, denounced this rumor and believed it could cause 
people to fear simple remedies. He urged the public to focus on the true source of 
influenza and its prevention. Foster believed that the epidemic had originated in Europe 
and had been brought to the United States on warships.6 
Infantry Captain Alcott Elwell thought that the influenza epidemic was an aspect 
of German propaganda. In a letter to the Times-Dispatch he criticized what he believed 
was an exaggeration of the epidemic: "You people of Richmond who fill your 
conversation to soldiers and friends with 'Scare headlines' about the epidemic of 
influenza are doing all you can to help the German cause as directly as if you were firing 
at your own troops from the rooftops." The New York Times reported that Germans had 
spread a story in a Mexican newspaper claiming that the bodies of influenza victims were 
piling up in the streets of New York City. The Acting Surgeon General of the Army 
denounced German propagandists for circulating reports that medical officers and nurses 
had been executed for spreading influenza in army camps.7 
1918. 
5Newport News Daily Press, 24 October 1918. 
6Roanoke Times, 28 September, 9, 10 October 1918. 
1Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 October 1918; New York Times, 19, 31 October 
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A doctor at Johns-Hopkins Hospital speculated that Chinese laborers brought to 
France to dig trenches had spread influenza in Europe. According to this theory, the 
Chinese had developed immunity to this type of influenza and pneumonia, but the 
Europeans, and later the Americans, had not. A Roanoke businessman believed that 
gases from heavenly bodies were the cause of influenza. One Richmond resident 
speculated that the epidemic emerged because of the dark phase of the moon. 8 Aside 
from the war, the Richmond Times-Dispatch considered the cause of the epidemic to be 
the "question of the day." The editors cautioned the public against believing various 
rumors that "cause people to think lightly of a serious question and not to take necessary 
precautions against a malady which is taking a heavy toll of deaths throughout the 
nation."9 
Rumors concerning death rates and the treatment of the sick also spread among 
the public. One man incorrectly informed a Roanoke Times reporter that 400 soldiers had 
died during a one day period at Camp Lee. Other reports maintained that the military 
was withholding proper medical treatment and food from ill soldiers, allowing them to 
die like diseased animals. In early October residents of an Alabama city heard that over 
5,000 cases of influenza existed in Roanoke and that deaths were recorded hourly. Even 
a man from nearby Salem believed that thousands of Roanoke residents had died. The 
difficulty in making a telephone call or sending a telegraph fueled these rumors. A father 
8Roanoke Times, 14, 17 December 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 October 
1918. 
9Ibid., 24 October 1918. 
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working in the Roanoke offices of Norfolk and Western tried for hours to contact his 
daughter after hearing that she was seriously ill at their home in Bristol. When he was 
finally able to reach her, he was relieved to discover she had only a cold. 10 
The public was warned to watch for the symptoms of influenza. An infected 
person suddenly felt ill and weak. Pain could develop in the eyes, ears, head, and back. 
Chills, a high fever, coughing, and sneezing followed. These symptoms usually lasted 
from three to four days. It was believed that Pfeiffer's bacillus was the cause of influenza; 
however, doctors discovered other "germs" that were potential sources for the illness. 11 
Doctors informed the public that the influenza germ could be passed from a 
person who exhibited no symptoms of the disease. Dr. William Brady, a syndicated 
newspaper columnist, advised his readers to remain five-feet away from others because 
droplets carrying the infection rarely traveled more than four feet. The State Board of 
Health recommended that people keep a three-foot distance from others when talking. 12 
According to the adherents of "droplet infection," facemasks successfully filtered 
and absorbed the individual germs carried through the air in these larger droplets. In 
September the USPHS advised those treating influenza patients to wear masks. Indeed, 
Dr. Brady believed people were morally bound to wear these cheesecloth or gauze masks. 
The public was instructed to wear masks in the presence of the sick and either bum or 
10Roanoke Times, 9 October 1918. 
11Ibid., 7 October 1918. 
12 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 31 October, 20 November 1918; Roanoke Times, 12 
October 1918. 
103 
boil the masks after use. The well-known Richmond physician Dr. J. Fulmer Bright 
urged both the sick and the healthy to wear masks over their nose and mouth as the best 
method of preventing the spread of influenza. 13 
Women from Red Cross chapters in cities such as Richmond, Petersburg, Norfolk, 
Lynchburg, and Roanoke made masks. In Richmond, the public could purchase these 
masks at their actual cost of three cents; while in Norfolk, city, state, and federal officials 
supplied them at no charge. The Roanoke Red Cross provided every volunteer nurse 
with a gauze mask. Because the supply of masks was limited, the local chapter warned 
the public to take good care of those they obtained. The Lynchburg Board of Health 
required bank tellers, streetcar employees, barbers, and dentists to wear masks. In 
Washington, D.C., the Red Cross distributed masks to government employees who wore 
them at work and on the streetcars. 14 
Richmonders quickly donned this "influenza camouflage." The demand for Red 
Cross masks became so great that volunteers were called upon to help make them. It 
took between six and ten minutes to make one five-by-six-inch mask with five layers of 
gauze. After doctors first instructed people to wear masks during the epidemic, the 
supply at the Richmond chapter was depleted several times each day. Men, women, and 
children waited in long lines at the Red Cross building on Fourth and Grace Streets for 
13Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 101; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 September, 9 
October 1918; Roanoke Times, 21December1918. 
14Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9, 13 October 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 8, 
17 October 1918; Roanoke Times, 19, 22 October 1918. 
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the masks, and Boy Scouts stationed at the entrance informed the public when a new 
supply was ready. 15 
The medical community was divided over the use of facemasks to prevent 
influenza. A California doctor believed that masks were only beneficial in an operating 
room. While they might be appealing to the public, facemasks did little to prevent one 
from becoming ill. Dr. Foster of Roanoke also was skeptical of their benefits. While he 
maintained that masks helped protect doctors and nurses from influenza, Foster 
acknowledged that people improperly wore facemasks, making them of little use to the 
general population. Dr. Edwin Jordan investigated the use of masks for the American 
Medical Association and reached similar conclusions. Jordan found that masks could 
benefit those caring for the sick, but offered little protection for the public. Indeed, health 
statistics in cities with masking regulations were no better than nearby communities 
without these ordinances. 16 
Along with avoiding crowds, coughs, and sneezes, health officials advised the 
public to follow a number of precautions. The Surgeon-General of the Army, William C. 
Gorgas, recommended that individuals follow the "Three C's" by keeping a clean mouth, 
clean skin, and clean clothes. Food should be carefully chosen, chewed well, and 
15 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9-11 October 1918. 
16Hoehling, The Great Epidemic, 84; Roanoke Times, 21 December 1918; Crosby, 
Epidemic and Peace, I 01-102, I 12-1 I 3. 
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followed by a couple glasses of water. Ill family members should be separated from 
others, and dishes used by the sick should be disinfected in boiling water. 17 
When a person became sick, doctors stressed the need for bed rest to prevent 
pneumonia. The Richmond Planet, however, questioned how easy it was to thwart the 
progression of influenza: "They tell us that people do not die from Spanish influenza, but 
with pneumonia. First, Spanish influenza; next, pneumonia; next, a doctor; next, an 
undertaker; next, a cemetery and a grave digger; next, and finally, Heaven as a resting 
place."18 In his instructions regarding the home care of influenza patients, Surgeon 
General Blue recommended that the rooms of the ill should be ventilated, clean, and kept 
at a comfortable temperature. Attendants treating the sick should wear masks at all times. 
A doctor should be called if the patient had a fever, coughed up blood-stained sputum, or 
experienced painful breathing. Due to the shortage of doctors and nurses, the Richmond 




They are simple measures. They have been thoroughly explained and published 
broadcast, and it is a duty every one owes to himself, to his family, and to his city 
to follow them to the letter. Otherwise he may be responsible for his own illness 
and the means of others contracting it. To be careless now is nothing short of 
criminal. 19 
17 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 25 September 1918; Roanoke Times, 25 October 
18Richmond Planet, 2 November 1918. 
19 Roanoke Times, 12, 15 October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9 October 
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Anti-spitting and sneezing ordinances were popular during the epidemic. The 
New York City Police Sanitary Squad embarked on a drive to stem public spitting and 
fined or jailed "open-face sneezers." The Chicago Health Commissioner and the Chief of 
Police ordered violators of the city's spitting ordinance arrested, as well as those who 
coughed or sneezed without a handkerchief.20 With Dr. Roy Flannagan in Chicago 
attending a conference, Richmond's Acting Chief Health Officer Dr. P. M. Chichester 
ordered all individuals with colds to carry handkerchiefs so that they could cover their 
sneezes at all times. Theater patrons who refused to do so would be ejected. The 
Roanoke Police Department also enforced an anti-spitting ordinance, and several 
offenders were brought to court for spitting on sidewalks. In a letter to the Times-
Dispatch, a Richmond resident implored the Board of Health to enforce the existing laws 
against spitting on public sidewalks and steps.21 
The cleanliness of soda fountains was another concern. Months before the 
influenza epidemic, a Richmond resident noted with disgust that a soda attendant had 
served him a lemonade in a dirty glass that had been cleaned only in a "slop basin." 
During the height of the epidemic, soda shops substituted paper cups for the usual glass 
variety. Norfolk officials required soft drinks to be served in paper cups and ordered 
restaurants to sterilize all cooking utensils and silverware. When the epidemic abated, 
20New York Times, 4, 27 October 1918; Hoehling, The Great Epidemic, 81. 
21 Roanoke Times, 8 October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 October, 13 
December 1918. 
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some cities allowed the return to glasses. When Newport News lifted its restrictions, 
however, patrons still were prohibited from using common cups or glasses.22 
The Roanoke police visited soda fountains to ensure that owners were sterilizing 
glasses. If proprietors did not implement sanitary precautions, the businesses would be 
closed. The Roanoke Times urged the public to adhere to Dr. Foster's regulations: 
The Health Department is not omnipotent. It cannot check influenza by merely 
willing to do so. All that it can accomplish is to minimize the danger of 
contagion, and this it has done by means and measures approved by health experts 
the country over .... It is up to the public to become acquainted with and heed the 
simple and obvious rules which have been laid down .... TI1ere is no occasion at 
all for anyone becoming panicky. There is every reason for all to be cautious and 
circumspect. 23 
After Roanoke officials lifted their "paper cup" ordinance, state sterilization regulations 
took effect during the second outbreak. Some soda fountain owners continued using 
paper cups, rather than risk contamination. Shop owners who improperly sterilized 
glasses received a summons to appear before the Roanoke Police Court. Judge Berkeley 
found that the individual soda clerks, and not the proprietors, should be responsible for 
their disregard of sanitation proccdures.24 
The sick sought out various remedies to cure them of influenza. Some believed 
that alcohol could alleviate flu symptoms. Governor Westmoreland Davis received 
1918. 
22Ibid., 11 October, 6 November 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 8, 27 October 
23Roanoke Times, 8, 10 October 1918. 
24Ibid., 5, 6 December 1918. 
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numerous requests from Virginians who wanted easier access to whiskey during the 
epidemic. Mrs. Cora B. Lemon of Oriskany, Virginia wrote the Governor: 
Can't some arrangement be made at once for a supply of whisky to be shipped to 
the doctor in charge here .... My sister is very ill with pneumonia and the Dr. 
prescribed whiskey to be used at once .... There is over one hundred cases of 
influenza under one Drs. care and the Dr. is very sick now. The Dr. sent here by 
the state a few days ago will leave here this P.M. for some other point. He is the 
one that prescribed the whiskey but could not stay long enough to order it sent to 
him.25 
Lexington resident R. W. Hawkins described people "dying off like flys" and appealed to 
the governor for whiskey to be taken "strictly as medicine." G. W. Warren, the mayor of 
Bristol, informed Davis that doctors had prescribed whiskey for patients in his city, but 
none was available. In response to these requests, Governor Davis replied that he had no 
authority over the sale of whiskey. He directed citizens to the commissioner of 
prohibition, Dr. J. Sidney Peters, who could sell alcohol to druggists. Those with a 
prescription could obtain small quantities of whiskcy.26 
There were reports of excessive whiskey consumption at Camp Lee. Responding 
to these allegations, the camp surgeon, Colonel Charles Brownlee, stated that alcohol was 
only used in limited amounts for pneumonia patients. Fredericksburg Judge John T. 
Goolrick reported that at the Quantico camp, the demand for alcohol "has been and is 
now urgent, imperative, and irresistible, to all of which we have responded to the very 
25Cora B. Lemon to Westmoreland Davis, 25 October 1918, Box 14, Davis 
Executive Papers. 
26R. W. Hawkins to Westmoreland Davis, 15 October 1918; G. W. Warren to 
Westmoreland Davis, 11 October 1918; Westmoreland Davis to J. N. Hale, 31 October 
1918; Westmoreland Davis to W. H. Wilson, 2 January 1919, Box 14, ibid. 
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best of our ability. In doing this we have obeyed the mandate of the Bible as found in 
Proverbs, Chapter 21, verse 6, 'to give strong drink to him who is ready to perish. "'27 
The Roanoke commonwealth's attorney had authority to dispense confiscated 
whiskey in emergencies. Instead of giving whiskey directly to the patient, he gave 
physicians a limited supply to be used in serious cases. A similar situation developed in 
Newport News. After local drug stores reported shortages of whiskey, suggestions were 
made to commandeer the supply seized in police raids. Prohibition Commissioner Peters 
gave Commonwealth's Attorney Captain C. C. Berkeley permission to dispense this 
whiskey to physicians. Ten days after the sale of whiskey to doctors was allowed, over 
one hundred quarts had been sold. The Daily Press reported that a large number of 
doctors had requested whiskey and were prescribing it to their patients. Commissioner 
Peters also ordered whiskey held by the Winchester police to be released to the city's 
Memorial Hospital, where it would be used to treat indigent pneumonia patients.28 
Advertisements for influenza preventatives, remedies, and cures filled newspapers 
during the epidemic. The manufacturers of Kolynos Dental Cream stated that their 
product would keep the teeth, mouth, and throat clean. The public was urged to brush and 
gargle with the product and place a small amount in each nostril at the first sign of a cold. 
Pro-Phy-Toi antiseptic mouthwash promised protection against influenza germs. 
27 Richmond Times-Dispatch. 24 October 1918, Judge John T. Goolrick, undated 
newspaper clipping attached to a letter to Governor Westmoreland Davis, 17 October 
1918, Box 14, ibid. 
28 Roanoke Times, 18 October 1918; Neuport News Daily Press, 11, 13, 24 
October 1918; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 October 1918. 
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Inhaling Oil of Hyomel would kill the germs that targeted the respiratory system. Dreco, 
a tonic made from roots, herbs, and berries, Horlick's Malted Milk, and Hood's 
Sarsaparilla were marketed as preventatives as well as ways to regain strength during 
recovery. The demand for Vick's Vaporub led to a shortage in drugstores throughout the 
country. By October 19, over two million jars of Vaporub had been sold. Customers 
applied the product on their throat and chest to facilitate breathing and "throw off' the 
influenza germs in the lungs. Some also mixed Vaporub and water in kettles and inhaled 
the steam to relieve congestion.29 
Newport News drug stores reported brisk business during the epidemic. Medicine 
was in short supply and druggists throughout the city needed additional clerks to fill 
prescriptions. Extra supplies of medication were slow to arrive, and the public was asked 
to be patient during the crisis. It was reported that the panic generated by Spanish 
influenza led people to request medicine that had not been prescribed and was oflittle 
benefit to the sick.30 By mid-October, business at the drug stores had slowed. The Daily 
Press reported that the public was disenchanted with the supposed cures: "Medicine, as 
the public is learning, is not by any means the best agent to be used in fighting the disease 
as a general thing. Rest, air, nourishment, and disinfection are the things to be 
considered, except in acute cases."31 
29Ibid., 11, 10, 15, 16, 18, 25, 29 October, 1 November, 3 December 1918. 
30Newport News Daily Press, 8, 10 October 1918. 
31 Ibid., 16 October 1918. 
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would cure pneumonia cases caused by streptococcus. He reported that only two of the 
twenty patients he treated with this serum had died. A Clifton Forge doctor reported that 
only one of his thirty-five pneumonia patients who received the serum had died. The 
State Board of Health distributed the serum to doctors and hospitals throughout Virginia. 
In Newport News, Dr. C.H. Waring of the Public Health Service ordered the serum, but 
admitted he did not know how effective it would be. Due to shortages in Roanoke 
drugstores, Dr. Foster recommended that Budd's serum be used only in pneumonia cases. 
Virginia health officials also investigated a serum developed and used by a St. Louis 
physician.34 
Dr. Russell A. Cecil, a native of Richmond and a major in the army medical 
corps, also developed a vaccine against pneumonia. Cecil began vaccinating soldiers 
upon their arrival at Camp Wheeler in Macon, Georgia. He planned to repeat these 
vaccinations at camps across the United States. Pneumonia vaccinations were also 
administered to soldiers at Camp Lee in December. Chicago health officials planned to 
vaccinate the entire population of the city with a serum developed by the Mayo brothers. 
The Newport News Daily Press hoped that a vaccine would be readily available to the 
public: "The anti-grippe serum, if it proves to be what it is hoped it will be, should be 
34Richmond Times-Dispatch, 18, 22, 23 October 1918; Newport News Daily 
Press, 19, 20 October 1918; Roanoke Times, 18, 19 October 1918; Westmoreland Davis 
to Frank E. Bowman, 22 January 1918, Box 14, Davis Executive Papers. 
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sold at a price to place it within reach of the masses and become an incident of 
preparation for winter as matter-of-fact as filling the coal bin used to be."35 
Physicians also questioned the effectiveness of these vaccines. Dr. W. H. Park, a 
member of the APHA committee on vaccines, believed vaccines should be used in a 
limited number of controlled cases. Park also criticized the arbitrary use of "stock 
vaccines" which he considered dangerous and of little benefit.36 Surgeon General Blue 
stated that the use of vaccines by the USPHS was still in the experimental phase and the 
results of the vaccinations were inconclusive: "The health service urges the public to 
remember that there is as yet no specific cure for influenza. The chief reliance must be 
on medical attention, good nursing, fresh air, nutritious food, plenty of water, and 
cheerful surroundings."37 Syndicated columnist Dr. William Brady cautioned his readers 
about the so-called grippe cures. Dr. Foster also warned Roanoke residents to be wary of 
advertisements promising remedies and cures for influenza. The remedies might be 
harmless, or in the worse case, they potentially could worsen the health of the user. 38 
35 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 7 October 1918; Roanoke Times, 22 October, 11 
December 1918; Newport News Daily Press, 1 October 1918. 
36New York Times, 13 December 1918. 
37 Roanoke Times, 27 October 1918. 




In the years following the pandemic of 1918, scientists attempted to discover 
the cause of influenza. Many doubted that Pfeiffer's bacillus was the source of the 
illness. In 1933, three British scientists, Christopher H. Andrews, P. P. Laidlaw, and 
Wilson Smith, conducted experiments to prove that a virus, not bacteria, caused 
influenza. Dr. Richard E. Shope had begun researching swine flu in 1928. An 
epidemic of flu had appeared in pigs during the fall of 1918 and had reappeared in the 
Midwest in the following autumns. Shope isolated the swine flu virus and theorized 
that it had worked in conjunction with Pfeiffer's bacillus to produce influenza. He 
postulated that a flu virus triggered by Pfeiffer's bacillus had caused the fall outbreak 
among humans.1 
Shope and the three scientists from England compared their data and made 
some important discoveries. In 1935 Andrews, Laidlaw, and Smith found antibodies 
to the swine virus in the blood of London residents who had lived during the 19 J 8 
epidemic. The blood of children younger than ten had no swine antibodies. Shope 
tested the blood of Americans and found high levels of antibodies to the swine virus 
in those over twelve years old. Those under twelve had low levels of the antibodies. 
1Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 286-290, 298-303. 
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In 1952, Dr. Thomas Francis, discovered the most swine antibodies among those born 
between 1915 and 1918, while those born after 1924 had no antibodies.2 
In 1995 Dr. Jeffery Taubenberger and a team of scientists at the Anned Forces 
Institute of Pathology began research on the lung tissue of victims of the 1918 flu. 
Two samples studied had been stored in the institute's facilities. The third sample 
was taken from the frozen corpse of a flu victim from Brevig, Alaska. By December 
1997 the scientists had sequenced a viral gene from the three tissue samples and 
found them to be identical. 3 
Despite these recent discoveries, scientists can only speculate about the 
origins of the influenza pandemic of 1918. Did this virus appear prior to the 
pandemic of 1918? Did the virus originate in Southern China, a region known to be a 
breeding ground of flu viruses? Did laborers from China bring the virus with them to 
Europe? In many respects, the influenza pandemic of 1918 remains a mystery. 
However, ongoing research may one day unlock the secrets of the deadly virus.4 
The influenza pandemic of 1918 should not be forgotten. In less than a year it 
spread across the globe, attacking the most productive members of society. In the 
United States, over a quarter of the population became ill and more than 600,000 
individuals died. Virginia struggled to deal with this unprecedented epidemic. State 
and local officials could do little to halt the spread of the deadly virus, and the 
2Ibid., 303-304; Kolata, Flu, 79-80. 
3Ibid., 212-218, 255-274. 
4Ibid., 281-298. 
I 16 
medical community lacked the resources to combat influenza. Localities throughout 
the state desperately needed extra doctors and nurses, and many communities were 
forced to open emergency hospitals to treat the large number of patients. At the 
height of the epidemic, officials urgently called for volunteers to battle influenza. 
Women responded to these requests and played an important role in caring for the ill. 
This menacing illness disrupted life in the state during the fall of 1918 as 
churches, schools, and other public places closed their doors. Due to the lack of 
knowledge about influenza, officials had few effective methods of limiting the spread 
of the disease. By the time the epidemic retreated, influenza had claimed the lives of 
thousands of Virginians and tested the state in ways that had not been experienced 
since the Civil War. 
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TABLE 1 
Summa!l'. of Deaths in V1!:9inia Cities and Count>es Wlth Rates per 1.000 
Number of Death Rate Number of Number of County Death 1918 per Thousand. lnnuenza Pneumonia 
s. 1918 Deaths. 1918 Deaths. 1918 
Accomac 614 15 33 124 43 
Albe mane 536 2062 106 11 
Alexandna. city 530 29 39 165 29 
Alexandna. county 193 15 87 54 10 
Alleghany 215 14 49 9 
Amelia 1n 19.71 27 6 
Amherst 309 15 59 77 10 
Appomattox 109 12 24 21 3 
Augusta 512 15.11 119 25 
Bath 73 96 7 1 
Bedford 433 14 65 84 25 
Bland 62 1202 12 1 
Botetourt 231 12 7 65 9 
Bnstol, city 138 18 06 51 3 
BrunSWICk 356 17 77 76 8 
Buchanan 299 2058 124 10 
Buckingham 230 15 13 37 9 
Buena Vista. city 97 2505 
" 
2 
Campbell 387 14 27 104 7 
Caroline 241 14 52 57 12 
Carroll 221 976 54 12 
Char1es City 76 13 98 12 4 
Char1otte 204 12 62 40 8 
Char1ottesvdle, city 220 18 01 43 9 
Chesteme~ 318 17 48 63 10 
Clarke 135 1806 36 5 
Clifton Forge 134 18 27 51 6 
Craig 50 968 11 2 
Culpeper 154 11 43 29 10 
Cumber1and 149 15 91 25 9 
Danville. city 500 24 58 102 35 
Dickenson 205 19 71 95 6 
Dinwiddie 565 36 47 74 10 
Elizabeth City 815 35 91 189 35 
Essex 140 14 89 15 5 
Fairfax 800 4199 531 30 
Fauquier 325 14 43 65 14 
Flo')'d 162 11 5 24 6 
Fluvanna 117 14 06 19 4 
Frankhn 275 1022 40 9 
Fredenck 150 11 74 40 2 
F reodeoe1tst>urg oty 164 2506 33 2 
Giles 162 13 16 38 3 
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Number of Death Rate Number of Number of County Deaths, 1918 per Thousand, Influenza Pneumonia 1918 Deaths. 1918 Deaths. 1918 
Gloucester 153 12.27 19 6 
Goochland 131 14.17 21 3 
Grayson 240 10.74 79 3 
Greene 101 13.39 28 0 
Greensville 226 16.54 72 4 
Halifax 706 16.65 219 32 
Hanover 305 17.73 55 9 
Henrico 347 21.12 79 16 
Henry 284 15.39 61 13 
Highland 55 10.35 6 1 
Isle of Wight 216 13.14 24 14 
James City 244 35.65 57 2 
King and Queen 148 15.04 28 5 
King George 85 13.22 6 3 
King William 202 26.28 37 5 
Lancaster 171 16.42 43 6 
Lee 439 16.16 203 8 
Loudoun 354 16.73 90 18 
Louisa 317 19.07 52 14 
Lunenburg 221 16.16 43 8 
Lynchburg, city 786 23.08 219 57 
Madison 112 11.14 17 1 
Mathews 137 14.43 21 8 
Mecklenburg 487 15.73 123 31 
Middlesex 172 16.33 33 8 
Montgomery 231 12.53 66 15 
Nansemond 486 16.17 81 30 
Nelson 193 11.06 28 9 
New Kent 81 17.29 8 0 
Newport News. city 798 32.33 209 127 
Norfolk, city 2722 20.01 623 189 
Norfolk county 1311 25.7 401 61 
Northhampton 287 15.04 47 20 
Northumberland 191 16.55 41 2 
Nottoway 228 15.86 30 8 
Orange 155 10.88 18 10 
Page 260 18.01 73 8 
Patrick 158 8.46 31 3 
Petersburg, city 856 32.96 201 46 
Pittsylvania 846 15.58 213 47 
Portsmouth 855 20.49 188 52 
Powhatan 107 17.53 20 4 
Prince Edward 229 16.06 37 17 
Prince George 1606 40.15 879 79 
Prince William 359 28.09 115 14 
Princess Anne 312 26.44 42 8 
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Number of Death Rate Number of Number of County Deaths, 1918 per Thousand, Influenza Pneumonia 1918 Deaths, 1918 Deaths, 1918 
Pulaski 338 17.4 125 13 
Radford, city 88 17.89 28 2 
Rappahannock 114 12.89 29 5 
Richmond, city 3824 23.79 590 218 
Richmond, county 108 14.05 6 9 
Roanoke, city 874 18.31 189 37 
Roanoke, county 387 18.41 75 21 
Rockbridge 296 13.98 68 12 
Rockingham 587 16.29 145 21 
Russell 398 14.22 156 16 
Scott 298 12.04 60 6 
Shenandoah 351 16.32 95 12 
Smyth 438 19.05 162 6 
Southampton 466 15.97 99 13 
Spotsylvania 148 20.94 32 8 
Stafford 102 11.49 14 3 
Staunton, city 381 31.78 40 49 
Surry 171 15.92 25 4 
Sussex 237 15.83 50 7 
Tazewell 489 19.23 195 19 
Warren 145 22.11 31 6 
Warwick 794 162.66 385 68 
Washington 449 12.47 129 16 
Westmoreland 183 19.53 20 10 
Winchester 175 27.13 47 7 
Wise 961 14.96 347 44 
Wythe 284 13.94 101 5 
York 213 26.66 91 10 
Total 44083 19.08 11352 2140 
Source: Annual Report of the State Board of Health and the State Health Commissioner to the 
Governor of Virginia for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1919, Richmond, Virginia 
1920, Table II. 
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